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Land deal dilemmas: Grievances, human rights, and investor protections
These solutions are considered in the context of governments’ legal 
obligations, particularly those imposed by international investment law, 
international human rights law, and investor-state contracts. Under-
standing the implications of legal obligations is particularly important 
in light of investors’ growing recourse to international investment 
arbitration, which can expose a government to liability under an 
international investment treaty for actions that may be in the best 
interest of a country and its citizens. Indeed, governments have been 
sued under investment treaties for policy measures taken in response 
to public protests and petitions tied to investment projects. As a further 
complication, governments may be in breach of international human 
rights law when they permit, facilitate, or participate in investments 
that do not comply with legally protected human rights norms.
Apart from compliance with legal obligations, host governments and 
investors alike have good reasons to address “land grievances,” which 
this report defines as concerns raised by local individuals or communi-
ties in response to the actual, perceived, or potential negative impacts 
of land-based investments. Land grievances often stem from serious 
impacts on lives and livelihoods. Given their severity, such grievances 
may trigger protests, legal cases, international advocacy campaigns, or 
violent conflict. Land grievances thus can increase operational costs 
and create reputational or legal risks for both the investor and the 
government. Addressing grievances as they arise can help mitigate, 
rather than exacerbate, their impacts.
This executive summary provides an overview of common land 
grievances, briefly describes governments’ competing legal obligations 
that may constrain their actions vis-à-vis investors and those who are 
affected by investments, and summarizes various options that govern-
ments can take to address land grievances.
LAND  
GRIEVANCES
Land-based investments have given rise to scores of grievances 
around the world. While grievances are specific to the project and 
the community, certain issues are particularly likely to cause or 
exacerbate grievances in the context of such investments:
 ö Displacement and related issues, such as: a lack of consultation 
or free, prior, and informed consent; a failure to provide suffi-
cient (or any) compensation; forced evictions; and correlated 
negative impacts on livelihoods and wellbeing when displace-
ment occurs;
 ö Negative effects of projects on the environment or cultural sites;
 ö Failure to realize expected or promised benefits from projects;
 ö Violence, ranging from physical assaults to killings, as well as 
repression of protests and inappropriate detention or arrests; 
and
 ö Corruption, non-compliance with legal requirements, or a lack 
of transparency.
Despite the strong reasons to address these and other grievances, 
however, government entities sometimes confront substantial 
obstacles in their pursuit of remedies. These include the frequent 
lack of clarity over the best solution; disagreements among gov-
ernment entities or opposition from an investor; and a complex 
web of legal obligations.
EXECUTIVE  
SUMMARY
Land-based investments can create significant grievances for local individuals or 
communities, and host governments seeking to address those grievances must navigate 
a complicated landscape of legal obligations and pragmatic considerations. This report 
focuses on practical solutions for governments confronting grievances that arise from 
large-scale investments in agricultural or forestry projects. 
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LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND OBLIGATIONS
Legal obligations relevant to land-based investments can be found in 
international law, domestic law, and, when applicable, in investor-state 
contracts. With respect to international law, two bodies of law are 
especially relevant: international investment law and international 
human rights law.
International investment law, which arises from a network of 
more than 3,000 investment treaties, is a particularly powerful force 
regulating governments’ treatment of foreign investors. Most invest-
ment treaties provide foreign investors with the right to sue their 
“host” governments in international investment arbitration. These 
treaties may be relevant even when not anticipated by a host govern-
ment, as an investor can sometimes maneuver to gain protection of 
a treaty that would otherwise not apply. If an investment arbitration 
tribunal finds that the government violated the investment treaty, 
it typically orders the government to pay monetary damages to the 
investor, which may cover both past losses and lost future profits. 
Some awards have been for staggering sums. And even if a government 
ultimately prevails in an arbitration, it may expend significant time and 
resources in defending itself.
International investment treaties commonly impose a core set of 
obligations on governments. These include the obligations:
 ö To not treat foreign investors less favorably than domestic  
investors (the national treatment” obligation) or less favorably  
than foreign investors from another country (the “most-favored 
nation” obligation);
 ö To ensure any expropriation is both lawful and accompanied by 
payment of just compensation;
 ö To provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment”;
 ö To provide foreign investors “full protection and security”; and
 ö To adhere to any commitment entered into or owed to foreign  
investors (the “umbrella clause”).
Each of these obligations has ramifications for governments’ options 
for addressing land grievances. However, while understanding the 
risks that arise under investment treaties can help a government better 
assess its options, such risks should not dissuade a government from 
taking good faith actions designed to address land grievances or comply 
with its obligations under human rights law.
These human rights obligations will often create countervailing 
pressures for governments in the context of land-based investments. 
Like investment treaties, human rights treaties provide mechanisms for 
those whose rights are violated to seek redress from governments.
Governments have three types of obligations related to human rights: 
to respect human rights (by refraining from violating them), to protect 
human rights (by preventing third parties from violating them), and to 
fulfill human rights (by taking steps, when applicable, to progressively 
realize them). The human rights most commonly affected by land-based 
investments include:
 ö The right to free, prior, and informed consent for  
indigenous peoples;
 ö The right to property;
 ö The right to housing and the prohibition of forced eviction;
 ö The rights to food, water, health, and a healthy environment;
 ö The rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression;
 ö The right to liberty and security of person (including the prohi-
bition of arbitrary arrest or detention), and the right not to be 
deprived arbitrarily of one’s life; and
 ö Rights related to labor and employment, such as the right to 
form trade unions and the right to just and favorable conditions 
of work.
In addition to international law, domestic laws and regulations are 
also relevant for host governments seeking to take action on land 
grievances. These domestic legal frameworks shape how land-based 
investments are undertaken and regulated, providing processes 
and rules to be followed. One distinction from international law is 
that domestic law frequently creates legal obligations for investors, 
rather than just for governments.
In countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise 
grants an investor access to land for agricultural or forestry 
projects, legal obligations may also arise from the investor-state 
contracts entered into between the government and the investor. 
Among other obligations for both governments and investors, 
these contracts occasionally include a stabilization clause limiting 
the ability of the government to change laws or policies that would 
negatively affect the project, or requiring compensation in such 
cases. These contracts also frequently provide for arbitration 
under the same or similar rules that govern arbitration arising 
from investment treaties. While only an investor can bring a claim 
for breach of an investment treaty obligation, either the investor 
or the government can bring a claim in domestic courts or under 
commercial arbitration for breach of a contractual obligation, 
depending on the contract’s dispute resolution provisions.
INTERACTION BETWEEN  
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Governments’ obligations under these different legal frameworks 
and agreements interact in various and complex ways. They may, at 
times, also conflict.
Investor-state contracts, for example, are generally subordinate 
to domestic law. However, a stabilization clause in a contract may 
seek to shield the investor from having to comply with or incur the 
costs of changes in the domestic law. This may be acceptable in 
some jurisdictions, but may be unenforceable in others. Yet even if 
a domestic court deemed a stabilization clause invalid, an invest-
ment arbitration tribunal may adopt a different view, enforcing 
it under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treatment 
obligation. (And even in the absence of a stabilization clause, some 
investment arbitration tribunals have determined that promises of 
legal stability can be implied in certain circumstances.)
An investment treaty can potentially protect an entire inves-
tor-state contract (or provisions in that contract) that might 
otherwise be illegal or unenforceable under domestic law—for 
example, if the government entity that signed the contract did 
not have the authority to do so under domestic law. Moreover, 
investment treaties have been interpreted in a way that effectively 
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creates new property rights that might not exist under domestic law; 
through the fair and equitable treatment standard, some investment 
arbitration tribunals have determined that investors’ rights and mere 
“legitimate expectations” are protected against subsequent government 
interference, essentially turning these expectations into enforceable 
property rights.
Investor-state contracts and international investment law can 
also interact with international human rights law to create poten-
tially conflicting obligations for host governments. For example, an 
investor-state contract granting a concession that would displace 
land users and violate their rights to food or housing would place the 
government’s human rights obligations in conflict with its contrac-
tual obligations. Similarly, a broadly framed stabilization clause in an 
investor-state contract may be in tension with a government’s human 
rights obligations to the extent that the clause limits the applicability to 
the underlying investment project of new laws or policies necessary to 
respect, protect, or fulfill human rights. An applicable investment treaty 
can create additional tensions between the government’s obligations 
under the investment treaty and under relevant human rights treaties. 
To date, international courts and tribunals have not provided much 
assistance in resolving potential conflicts between treaty obligations, 
tending either to avoid finding that a conflict exists or to resolve a 
dispute based only on one set of legal obligations.
In some situations, a government’s legal obligations are not easy to 
reconcile. Thus, governments seeking to redress land grievances should 
take into account the full range of their legal obligations, and how such 
obligations may reinforce or conflict with each other, as they consider 
the options at their disposal.
SPECIFIC OPTIONS FOR  
ADDRESSING GRIEVANCES
A government that hosts land-based investments may need to address 
distinct land grievances that have been triggered by a particular 
investment or investor. The following options are actions that a host 




A government can ask an investor to modify its actual or planned opera-
tions to help address related grievances. When the investor is exercising 
rights given to it under a contract, license, or other authorization, 
such a request would be for voluntary action, but there are pragmatic 
reasons why an investor might comply. This type of request is likely 
permissible under international investment law, although investment 
arbitration tribunals have found governments liable for efforts to 
force or pressure investors into giving up their contractual rights. This 
strategy thus depends on agreement by the investor.
SHAPING OR RESHAPING  
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES
In limited contexts, a government may be bound by an investor-state 
contract that does not explicitly delineate the specific boundaries of 
the land the investor will use. This opens up the possibility that 
the government can “shape” concession boundaries to minimize 
negative impacts on local communities and thus reduce griev-
ances. Additionally, even when the concession boundaries have 
already been established, a government may seek to “reshape” the 
boundaries to address grievances over land allocation. This may 
require a full renegotiation of the investor-state contract, or could 
be documented through a side letter or a simple amendment to 
the contract. Efforts to shape or reshape boundaries should be 
undertaken in consultation with, and with the consent of, poten-
tially affected individuals or communities. As with the option to 
request investor action, international investment law may constrain 
a government’s ability to seek renegotiation, while overuse of this 
strategy may also create reputational risks.
FACILITATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES FOR  
AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
A government can facilitate a range of efforts to resolve disputes, 
including through establishing, supporting, or helping affected 
individuals or communities to access dispute resolution processes. 
These include local courts and tribunals, as well as “non-judicial” 
mechanisms, which are not meant to replace domestic courts, 
but can provide additional ways to address concerns. While such 
processes come in many forms, four types are particularly relevant 
for land grievances: non-judicial public institutions; govern-
ment-supported mediation and facilitation between communities 
and investors; project-level grievance mechanisms established 
by the investor, either voluntarily or in compliance with govern-
ment requirements; and external grievance mechanisms, such as 
those provided by certification schemes or development finance 
institutions. While dispute resolution processes can help minimize 
conflict and foster solutions, they can also compound conflicts and 
grievances when not designed and implemented according to best 
practices.
RESTITUTING PROPERTY TO DISPLACED  
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
Grievances flowing from land-based investments are often related 
to displacement from land; in some cases, restitution of property to 
those who were displaced may be the best way to address grievances 
and comply with human rights obligations. However, restitution 
of land already allocated to an investor may not always be possible 
(for instance, if it has been irreversibly damaged), or may not be 
deemed appropriate (for example, when the land was considered 
to have been expropriated for a public purpose). Restitution of 
land previously given to an investor may also raise risks related to 
a government’s legal obligations under a contract or an applicable 
investment treaty. A government seeking to take land from an 
investor and return it to displaced individuals or communities 
should thus first determine whether the investor has valid rights 
to the land, and, if so, follow requirements set by domestic and 
international law regarding expropriation of property.
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COMPENSATING AFFECTED  
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
Compensating individuals or communities that have been or will be 
negatively affected by a land-based investment is another option for 
addressing land grievances. While compensation is often an insufficient 
remedy, at times it may be the most appropriate option available. When 
provided, compensation—which can include the provision of land, 
goods, services, and/or money—should be determined in consulta-
tion with those affected, and should seek to restore project-affected 
individuals or communities to a position that is as favorable as, or more 
favorable than, their position before the harm causing the grievance 
occurred. Where a community remains on the land and the grievance 
concerns future impacts of an investment, compensation will be less 
appropriate, unless the community has provided its free, prior, and 
informed consent. A government otherwise seeking to “resettle and 
compensate” may violate its legal obligations under human rights law, 
or risk inflaming community discontent that could lead to disruption of 
the investment project or other negative outcomes.
RENEGOTIATING WITH  
THE INVESTOR
When land grievances arise from the legal terms of the investor-state 
contract or the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under that 
contract, a government might explore renegotiation of the inves-
tor-state contract. Renegotiations can be challenging, however, particu-
larly if an investor is unwilling to give up rights previously secured or to 
take on new obligations. Efforts to understand the investor’s strategy 
and culture can be helpful for assessing whether it might agree to a re-
negotiation request. If a government tries to exercise political pressure 
and takes or threatens sovereign action to force renegotiation, however, 
this can raise the risk of liability under a contract or investment treaty. 
Because of this risk, a government seeking to renegotiate should try to 
do so using only the weight that a normal contracting party would use.
TERMINATING AN  
INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT
Another option for addressing land grievances related to an inves-
tor-state contract is to terminate the contract. Typically, the terms of 
the contract and domestic law will specify the grounds on which one or 
both parties may or must terminate the contract, as well as any related 
remedies. Even if a government has concluded that it has valid rights to 
terminate the contract, the investor may nevertheless seek to challenge 
the termination through domestic courts, commercial arbitration, or 
investment arbitration. In addition, a government may occasionally 
decide that contract termination is in its best interests even when not 
permitted; in such a case, it may simply plan to terminate and then pay 
compensation and/or face legal actions.
REVOKING OR TERMINATING AUTHORIZATIONS  
NECESSARY FOR INVESTOR OPERATIONS
Similarly to terminating a contract, a government may decide to 
address land grievances in certain cases by revoking or terminating 
existing permits or other authorizations that are necessary for 
investor operations. While revoking authorizations can benefit a gov-
ernment and communities in some situations—for example, if the 
revocation was due to harms caused by the investor—such an action 
may pose legal, economic, and political challenges. At the domestic 
level, it may prompt negative reactions from stakeholders affected by 
the action. At the international level, a foreign investor’s home state 
may use diplomatic channels to seek reversal of the decision, or the 
investor may challenge it under an international investment treaty 
or the investor-state contract. If government officials complied with 
substantive and procedural legal requirements, revocations are more 
difficult to challenge. However, neither good faith nor compliance 
with domestic law will necessarily immunize permit revocations 
from successful challenges under investment treaties.
GENERAL OPTIONS FOR  
ADDRESSING GRIEVANCES
Host governments may also seek to improve their overarching 
approach to addressing land grievances by implementing more 
systemic change or by minimizing their general liability under invest-
ment treaties. Taking proactive and general steps can be advanta-
geous at times, and a host government concerned about protecting 
its citizens from the negative impacts of investments may wish to 
consider the below steps either before or after problems arise.
DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY  
FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM
Land grievances will often center on issues that require comprehen-
sive solutions, such as through law or policy reform. A government 
may develop a national strategy for reforming laws or policies 
to better protect against the negative impacts of investments or 
other business operations. National Action Plans on business 
and human rights (“NAPs”) are one example of a national policy 
strategy that can be undertaken. NAPs do not have any legal force, 
but are intended to guide legal and policy reform. They also can 
improve coordination among government departments, enhancing 
the government’s ability to regulate investments. In addition, the 
process of developing a national policy strategy may potentially help 
a government avoid or succeed in an investment dispute, by assisting 
the government in establishing that its reforms were reasonable, 
legitimate, and considered.
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ADOPTING CHANGES 
IN THE LAW
Grievances regarding land-based investments may arise because of 
inadequate domestic laws that create, exacerbate, or fail to protect 
against harms. If so, changes to the legal framework, including to the 
constitution, to laws, or to regulations or administrative policies, may 
help to holistically address concerns. However, in addition to opposi-
tion from certain stakeholders and associated political hurdles, these 
changes may face legal challenges regarding their consistency with 
other legal norms and obligations. Contractual stabilization clauses 
and international investment treaties are two such potential sources of 
conflict: an investor benefiting from a stabilization clause may either 
be freed from, or be entitled to compensation for the costs of, having 
to comply with changes in the law, while an investment arbitration 
tribunal may find that promises of stability in the legal framework can 
be inferred even in the absence of such a clause.
REQUESTING AN ADVISORY OPINION  
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL
A host government under the jurisdiction of either the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights or the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights could seek an advisory opinion on complying with its human 
rights obligations in the context of other legal obligations, such 
as those contained in international investment treaties. Advisory 
opinions are not binding, but their persuasive character render 
them important sources for clarifying international legal rights and 
corresponding government obligations. While an advisory opinion 
would generally focus on overarching issues, rather than on specific 
investments or grievances, and would not be binding on an investment 




A host government may wish to assess how its investment treaty 
obligations would be interpreted in any future disputes brought before 
an investment arbitration tribunal. Although a government cannot 
unilaterally change these obligations (except by pulling out of a treaty 
altogether), it can take steps to assist future tribunals in interpreting 
such obligations. Two mechanisms for doing so are through estab-
lishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice” on the 
meaning of its treaties. This includes using inter-state agreements and 
domestic practices to demonstrate its understanding of investment 
treaty obligations. Although subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice do not generally bind tribunals, they provide governments 
with an important opportunity to help shape the interpretations given 
to a treaty. Taking such steps thus might be useful for governments 
that anticipate potential problems related to land-based investments, 
and are concerned that their investment treaty obligations might be 
interpreted in a way that they do not intend.
DECLINING TO CONCLUDE NEW TREATIES,  
AND TERMINATING OR NOT RENEWING EXISTING TREATIES
Some governments concerned about the implications of interna-
tional investment treaties on their ability to address land grievances 
may decide to review their treaty policies, place moratoria on 
the negotiation of new investment treaties, or terminate existing 
treaties. These actions can help reduce exposure to claims and liabili-
ties for conduct that affects the rights or expectations of foreign 
investors. These strategies may not necessarily eliminate the costs 
of those treaties, however. For instance, even when an investment 
treaty has been terminated, it may have a survival clause that keeps 
it and its investment arbitration provisions in force for a set period 
of time. And even if a government decides not to conclude new 
treaties, it will still remain vulnerable to claims and liability under 
existing ones. This may be a significant limitation, given the ability of 
investors to structure their investments in order to gain protection 
of other investment treaties.
MOVING  
FORWARD
Dealing with grievances related to land-based investments can be 
complicated for host governments. The investor and project-affected 
communities will often have opposing perspectives on how to 
resolve grievances. Moreover, the complex web of legal obligations 
that bind a government can constrain its options, rendering it 
difficult to achieve optimal solutions in all cases.
In spite of these complications, host governments have at their 
disposal a range of options to address land grievances. Not all 
options are suitable for every situation, and some entail risks. The 
risk of doing nothing, however, will often be greater—for govern-
ments, investors, and affected individuals and communities.
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Such situations can be particularly precarious for governments that 
have signed international investment treaties providing investor 
protections. In this context, making a decision that is in the best 
interest of the country and its citizens may expose a government to 
potential liability under an investment treaty, and can lead to costly 
investor-state arbitration (also known as “investor-state dispute settle-
ment” (ISDS)). Indeed, governments have been sued under investment 
treaties for policy measures taken in response to public protests 
and petitions tied to investment projects. As a further complication, 
governments may be in breach of international human rights law when 
they permit, facilitate, or participate in investments that do not comply 
with legally protected human rights norms.
On a pragmatic level, host governments and investors both have 
good reasons to address “land grievances,” which this report defines 
as concerns raised by local individuals or communities in response 
to the actual, perceived, or potential negative impacts of land-based 
investments. Land grievances can lead to conflict, increased operational 
costs, and reputational risks for both the investor and the  
government. They can also threaten the stability of the investment 
itself, leading to the risk that the expected benefits of the investment 
will not materialize.
There are various steps that host governments can take to address 
land grievances, but little guidance exists for doing so. Rather, more 
focus has been placed on the ex ante best practices that should be 
followed before investments are made. While there is no substitute for 
ensuring at the outset that investments are responsible and sustainable, 
the knowledge gap regarding what to do once investments have been 
undertaken is particularly concerning given the number of land deals 
that have been concluded since the turn of the twenty-first century1 and 
the growing willingness of investors to have recourse to investor-state 
arbitration.2 As host governments are increasingly encouraged to ensure 
that land-based investments are responsible, they will more frequently 
confront the thorny question of how to deal with problems stemming 
from existing investments, particularly in light of their legal obligations.
This report provides practical solutions for host governments that 
have already granted or facilitated large-scale land-based investments 
for agricultural or forestry projects,3 and that subsequently seek to 
address land grievances arising from them. In particular, it aims to 
assist governments to resolve such grievances pragmatically while also 
fulfilling their legal obligations under human rights law and minimizing 
potential liability under international investment law and investor-state 
contracts. The report may also be of interest to other stakeholders; 
these include: bilateral aid agencies and multilateral organizations 
interested in sustainable investments, civil society groups and commu-
nities advocating for better protection of their rights, investors striving 
to resolve grievances and align with best practices, lawyers working 
with any of these stakeholders, arbitrators seeking to understand the 
wider context of investment disputes, and researchers focused on 
land-based investments.
The report is based on legal research, a survey of reported grievances 
arising from agricultural or forestry projects, and expert interviews.4 
Part I provides an overview of land-based investments and the griev-
ances that arise from them. Part II explores governments’ competing 
obligations under different legal frameworks that may constrain or 
influence their actions toward investors and those affected by invest-
ments: in particular, obligations arising from investment law, human 
rights law, and investor-state contracts. Part III describes various 
options that governments can take to address land grievances. These 
are grouped into two categories: specific actions to address distinct 
grievances related to a particular investment, and general steps to 
implement more systemic change or minimize potential liability under 
investment treaties more broadly.5
Governments that host foreign investments in agriculture or forestry often encounter 
grievances from persons adversely affected by such investments. While many 
governments regard land-based investments as potential vehicles for accelerating 
national development, governments are also finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the 
significant concerns raised by local individuals and communities. Yet seeking to mitigate 
the adverse effects of existing investments and address related grievances can place 
governments in confrontation with investors that are not open to altering their operations.
INTRODUCTION
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Large-scale land-based investments for agricultural or forestry 
projects have been of sustained interest to a number of host govern-
ments, as well as investors. This is by no means a new phenomenon; 
some agricultural concession agreements still in operation in Liberia, 
for example, were signed in the 1950s. Yet a noticeable increase in 
international investments since the mid-2000s, and particularly 
after the 2007-2008 food price crisis, has led to what academics and 
advocates alike have described as a “global land rush.” Investors 
have been interested in such transactions primarily for commercial 
motives, although at times have been driven by other reasons, such as 
food security concerns. Certain governments, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries, have sought such investment in order to 
increase capital flows, create jobs, enable technology transfer, or 
catalyze more productive agricultural operations.
Evidence suggests that the scale of these land-based investments is 
not as high as frequently described,6 and that their pace has slowed in 
recent years.7 Nuances have also been lost in reporting around these 
investments: the role of national investors and medium-scale invest-
ments, for example, has often been overlooked in favor of the interna-
tional and the large-scale. Moreover, given the difficulties inherent in 
agricultural projects, some investments made during the past decade 
have already failed, while many others have never been implemented. 
Whether the pace of land-based investments will pick up again  
is unclear, although the factors that drove previous interest 
continue to be in play. Growing populations with more re-
source-intensive diets and lifestyles, as well as the impact of 
climate variability on agricultural yields, will continue to exert 
demand for crops that provide food, fuel, and other products. 
Private sector interest (both international and domestic) persists, 
and some host governments continue to tout the agricultural 
sector as a prime investment opportunity. Land, and the water that 
comes with it to make it arable,8 are finite resources in a planet 
with a growing appetite.
Regardless of overall future prospects either at a global scale or 
in any specific country, many land-based investments have already 
been undertaken. Governments that host significant investment 
thus face the challenge of ensuring that expected benefits materi-
alize while also addressing any negative consequences that occur. 
The choices they make to do so may, at times, render it difficult to 
comply with their relevant legal obligations, as this report explains. 
Part I provides context for the report by describing the grievances 
that can arise from land-based investments, the benefits for both 
governments and investors of addressing such grievances, and the 
difficulties that governments may encounter in doing so.
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surprising that displacement from land constitutes a key grievance tied 
to land-based investments. While governments may consider certain 
land to be “available” for investment, this designation does not mean 
that the land is not used or relied on by communities and individuals, 
as evidenced by the resettlement provisions included in some inves-
tor-state contracts. And while much has been made of “underutilized” 
land ready for investment, research has shown that investments are 
likely to be made on densely or moderately populated and accessible 
land, including croplands, rangelands, and fallow agricultural land.12
Physical displacement due to a government’s provision of land to an 
investor is sometimes accompanied by allegations of forced evictions, 
often without consent, consultation, or adequate compensation. The 
numbers can be staggering, with investments sometimes displacing 
thousands of individuals.13
The provision of land directly by communities or individuals, rather 
than the government, may also lead to grievances linked to the resulting 
displacement. An agreement reached between an investor and a commu-
nity leader, for example, may not have been representative of all commu-
nity members’ interests. Some individuals, meanwhile, have claimed that 
they were intimidated into providing investors with rights to use their 
land, or had not properly understood the agreement they reached with 
an investor. And even when individuals have willingly provided land, 
they may subsequently regret this upon realizing that the payment or 
benefits they received were insufficient to compensate for the land they 
have given up. This, too, can engender grievances.
Other grievances linked to displacement from land or resources relate 
to the correlated negative impacts when such displacement occurs. 
Particularly when compensation is not adequate, displacement disrupts 
livelihoods and has a serious impact on wellbeing. Among other effects, 
such disruption can reduce food security for displaced individuals. 
Displacement may also decrease access to services, either physically 
or economically, with displaced individuals noting negative impacts 
on education and health. Even when displacement is accompanied by 
adequate compensation and access to services, it can disrupt social 
networks and patterns in ways that negatively affect displaced individ-
uals and their communities.
LAND GRIEVANCES 
Land-based investments have given rise to scores of grievances around 
the world.9 The reasons for such grievances are varied, ranging from 
the failure of promised benefits to materialize to forced evictions, 
violence, and even killings. They have arisen when the transferred land 
was provided by the government, as well as when land was provided 
by the community or individuals. Grievances also emerge at various 
stages of the project cycle, from before a project has been imple-
mented to after a project has ended. While land grievances are specific 
to the project and the community, the authors’ review of 40 cases of 
grievances arising from agricultural or forestry projects, as well as 
interviews conducted with lawyers and advocates, provides insight 
into common types of grievances related to land-based investments,  
as well as various measures that governments, investors, and commu-
nities have taken in response.
DISPLACEMENT AND  
RELATED GRIEVANCES
Displacement from land, along with related issues, represents  
one of the most common grievances arising from land-based invest-
ments. This includes displacement from land on which individuals 
were living, as well as from land on which individuals had relied  
for farming, gathering of resources (such as for food, medicine, 
or building materials), or other activities upon which livelihoods 
depended. It covers physical displacement, for example, relocation, 
as well as economic displacement, such as losing access to assets 
necessary for livelihoods.10 Related issues include a lack of consulta-
tion or free, prior, and informed consent before displacement;  
a failure to provide sufficient (or any) compensation for such  
displacement; and forced evictions.
Given the significance of land for many people from an economic, 
social, political, cultural, and sometimes spiritual perspective, it is not 
BOX 1: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT  
VERSUS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT:  
A FALSE DICHOTOMY?
This report focuses primarily on foreign investments, as inter-
national investment treaties that protect foreign investors raise 
important considerations for governments seeking to address 
land grievances. However, many of the same issues and options 
are relevant in the case of domestic investments. Regardless of 
whether an investment is foreign or domestic, governments are 
still bound by a range of legal obligations arising from interna-
tional human rights law, domestic law, and, when applicable, 
investor-state contracts. In instances where domestic investments 
give rise to land grievances, governments will still want to address 
them, including by using the solutions described in this report.
The lines between domestic investment and international 
investment are often blurred. Many international investors incor-
porate an entity in the jurisdiction in which they are investing in 
order to receive various benefits or meet certain requirements. 
A company that does this can likely still be considered a foreign 
investor for the purposes of any dispute related to the invest-
ment.11 At the same time, domestic investors have in some cases 
managed to obtain investment treaty protection meant for foreign 
investors by establishing a corporate entity in a foreign country 
and then routing their investments through that entity and back 
to the host country.
BOX 2: MAJOR GAPS IN THE  
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNITY LAND
Many people are particularly vulnerable to displacement due 
to the limited formal recognition of community land across the 
globe. Researchers estimate that communities “hold as much as 
65 percent of the world’s land area through customary, communi-
ty-based tenure systems,” but that “governments only recognize 
formal, legal rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities 
to a fraction of these lands.”14 While some governments have begun 
to take steps to increase formal recognition of community land, the 
current gaps have likely facilitated the granting of concessions that 
cause individuals and communities to be displaced from the land 
and resources on which they rely.15 Moreover, adequate compensa-
tion for physical or economic displacement from communal land 
or resources may be less likely when the land has not been formally 
recognized by the government.16
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NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT  
OR CULTURAL SITES
Closely tied to displacement is the impact that investment operations 
may have on the environment or on cultural sites. Investment projects 
may harm the environment by their very design—for example, multiple 
communities have raised grievances related to the destruction of 
forests for palm oil projects—or as a result of inattention to envi-
ronmental impacts and failure to mitigate related risks. Pollution or 
diversion of water resources is a particularly concerning impact, with 
some grievances stemming from a lack of safe drinking water due to 
an investment. Grievances also can arise when cultural sites, such as 
ancestral graves, are destroyed, or when access is restricted due to 
project operations.
FAILURE TO REALIZE  
BENEFITS FROM PROJECTS
Another recurrent set of grievances relates to project-affected individ-
uals’ or communities’ belief that they have not received appropriate 
benefits from the project, or the benefits that had been promised. 
Some common benefits that communities expect relate to jobs, local 
infrastructure, provision of education or electricity, or local content, 
such as commitments to purchase certain supplies or services from the 
local community. These benefits may have been described by the  
government or by the investor. They are sometimes noted in a 
document, such as a Memorandum of Understanding, signed with the 
community or with individuals. More frequently, they may have been 
discussed orally. In places where oral contracts are a traditional way 
to make an agreement, grievances may be particularly high when oral 
promises are not fulfilled, leaving community members to feel they 
have been deceived.17
Grievances about jobs are two-fold. The first concern is often that 
there are simply not as many jobs as had been promised, or as may 
be needed to offset the loss of livelihoods resulting from the invest-
ment. In some cases, jobs are provided to workers from outside of the 
community, which may give rise to grievances when local communities 
expected to benefit from such jobs. In other cases, jobs may be provided 
to some subset of local workers to the detriment of others. The second 
concern relates to working conditions, as well as wages. Workers may 
find that the jobs that have materialized are not satisfactory—the wages 
may not be adequate to meet their needs, the hours may be difficult to 
combine with their own farming efforts, or the working conditions may 
be harsh, without the shoes, safety equipment, or other materials that 
were promised or are necessary. 
VIOLENCE AND OTHER INFRINGEMENTS  
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
In some places, land-based investments have been associated with 
violence, ranging from physical assaults to killings. This may be coupled 
with intimidation, as well as other infringements on civil and political 
rights, including repression of protests and inappropriate detentions 
or arrests. These acts, which provoke grievances from individuals or 
communities, are often reactions to the expression of grievances. They 
are part of a downward spiral, whereby investments create grievances, 
individuals or communities raise these grievances through protest or 
other action, the investor or the government takes steps to clamp down 
on the resulting actions through arrests or violence, and these steps 
provoke even greater grievances on the part of the affected individuals 
or communities. At the most extreme, this negatively reinforcing 
cycle can lead to violence on both ends—from disaffected community 
members and from the investor, the government, or security forces 
controlled by either—and can result in a tragic loss of life,20 including  
of innocent bystanders.21 
ILLEGALITY, CORRUPTION,  
AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
Yet another set of grievances arising from land-based investments relate 
to concerns about whether an investment complies with relevant legal 
requirements, whether the investment was tainted by corruption or 
conflicts of interest, and the level of transparency around the invest-
ment. These issues may not be the proximate cause of concerns related 
to an investment—individuals or communities are more likely to first 
take issue with an investment because of the direct negative impacts 
on their lives—but they can engender significant additional frustration 
about a project. These issues may also be raised in advocacy against the 
investment, or in legal actions or non-judicial complaints procedures.
BENEFITS OF ADDRESSING  
LAND GRIEVANCES
Host governments and investors alike have good reasons to address 
grievances related to land-based investments. Land grievances often 
stem from serious impacts on lives and livelihoods. Given their 
significant implications, such grievances have triggered a number of 
actions by individuals and communities, including protests, legal cases, 
and international advocacy campaigns. In some cases, land grievances 
have also led to the destruction of property or have instigated violent 
conflict. These responses to grievances create risks for both the investor 
and the government that point to the practical benefits of addressing 
grievances as they arise in order to mitigate, rather than exacerbate, 
their impacts.
BOX 3: WHAT ABOUT ILLEGAL  
OR INVALID CONCESSIONS? 
Concerns have been raised in multiple countries that certain 
land-based investments and their governing agreements fail 
to comply with domestic legal requirements. For example, in 
Cambodia, government officials have granted economic land 
concessions that have not met requisite pre-conditions, that 
exceed legal size limits, or that otherwise run contrary to appli-
cable laws.18 In Papua New Guinea, a Commission of Inquiry inves-
tigating Special Agriculture & Business Leases found that multiple 
leases failed to comply with statutory requirements, and ultimately 
recommended replacing the entire system of leases due to serious 
abuses.19 When government entities have granted concessions that 
do not meet all legal requirements or that are otherwise invalid, 
another government entity—from the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch—might subsequently determine that the conces-
sion is invalid under domestic law, and may cancel or modify it. 
While such steps can assist in ensuring compliance under domestic 
law, an investor might then raise a claim that such cancellation 
or modification breaches the government’s obligations under an 
investment treaty.
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Indeed, while some host governments, or entities within host govern-
ments, may be driven to address grievances by genuine concern for 
the most vulnerable of their citizens, others may believe that the ad-
vantages associated with land-based investments are worth the trade-
offs that they entail. Yet addressing grievances ultimately benefits the 
country as a whole. This includes providing economic benefits—for 
instance, minimizing potential conflict can make the country a more 
attractive destination for investors22—as well as broader benefits, 
such as supporting greater democratic responsiveness. 
Investors likewise have incentives to minimize the grievances that 
arise from an investment. First and foremost, grievances can harm the 
investor’s “social license to operate,” which is often as valuable as any 
regulatory license needed for operations.23 Given the importance of 
this social license, as well as the potential reputational and legal risks 
tied to land grievances, investors can also benefit from addressing 
concerns, or facilitating the host government’s efforts to do so.
OBSTACLES IN ADDRESSING  
LAND GRIEVANCES
Even though, in theory, all stakeholders may have strong reasons to 
address land grievances, government entities can confront substantial 
obstacles in their pursuit of remedies. These include a lack of clarity 
over the best solution for any particular situation, opposition within 
or outside of the government, and legally enforceable commitments 
that are in tension with possible remedies that a government  
might implement.
Grievances that are easy to articulate may be hard to resolve. In 
some cases, there may be no way to fully remedy what has already 
occurred. The destruction of a sacred site, or razing of forested 
land that had provided important resources, for example, cannot 
be undone. In other cases, there may be disagreements within the 
aggrieved community regarding the remedies they seek. Some people, 
for instance, may be willing to receive in-kind compensation for 
their land, while others may refuse any shift in land access. The lack 
of clear solutions for a particular situation may increase community 
opposition to any proposed step to address grievances.
Opposition to government action can also come from within the 
government itself. Certain government entities may be more inclined 
to address the grievances arising from a land-based investment than 
others. National development strategies, for example, might conflict 
with the policies and priorities of local governments. Parliamentarians 
might have different opinions on the benefits of an investment than 
the executive branch, while the part of the executive branch mandated 
to protect the environment might view an investment quite differ-
ently from the part charged with attracting investment. A government 
entity thus may find itself constrained by other government actors in 
its attempts to address grievances.
A government might also confront an investor that is unwilling to 
change its operations to help mitigate related grievances. This may 
place the government in the unenviable position of trying to placate 
its citizens as well as the investor. In addition, home governments 
at times reinforce pressure on the host government to act favorably 
towards the investor, rendering efforts to address grievances at the 
expense of the investor even more difficult.
The legally enforceable commitments made by a host government 
to the investor also present an obstacle to redressing grievances. 
Through investor-state contracts, for example, host governments 
generally provide the investor with a set of rights that are legally 
enforceable. This can constrain options. Restitution of land, for 
instance, may be difficult when an investor with rights to the land in 
question opposes such a measure. In addition to the rights provided 
via contracts, licenses, or other domestic authorizations, governments 
also are bound by a web of international and domestic legal obliga-
tions, including obligations to protect human rights, and, for most 
governments, obligations to protect the rights of foreign investors. 
These legal obligations can also affect the options available to govern-
ments, as discussed in Parts II and III.
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BOX 4: THE ROLE OF  
HOME GOVERNMENTS 
Governments of countries from which outward investment flows 
(“home governments”) play a complicated role in the context of 
land-based investments and related grievances. Home govern-
ments often provide diplomatic, economic, or other support for 
investors that are based or headquartered in their country and 
undertaking outward investment. Some governments have proved 
willing to provide such support even in the face of alleged social or 
environmental harms caused by the investor.
Yet governments’ obligations under human rights law arguably 
have extraterritorial reach, which may require home governments 
to regulate outward investors to ensure that their actions do not 
negatively affect human rights.24 Apart from legal obligations, 
home governments have other reasons for seeking to ensure that 
outward investments are implemented responsibly, including 
increasing policy coherency or complying with the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.25
Home government measures to promote more responsible 
investment can help prevent or mitigate land grievances arising 
from outward investment. Such measures include:
 ö Regulating the actions of outward investors;26 
 ö Conditioning diplomatic or financial support for outward  
investors on compliance with certain standards  
or processes; and 
 ö Establishing disclosure requirements for outward investment 





Governments operate in the context of international and domestic laws, and are also bound by the contracts 
into which they enter. These legal frameworks and agreements generally create legally binding obligations. 
Such obligations are enforceable through different mechanisms and to varying degrees.27 They constrain 
how governments can or should act, delineating remedies for when governments breach their corresponding 
duties. In the context of land grievances, the legal obligations incumbent on a host government may influence 
its actions vis-à-vis investors and those who are affected by investors’ actions.
This Part provides a brief overview of these legal frameworks and obligations, and their relevance to the 
choices host governments make to address land grievances. The interaction between these legal obligations 
can be complex, and this discussion also highlights some of the ways in which obligations may affect or 
conflict with each other. 
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LAWS AND  
CONTRACTS
Governments are bound by an intricate web of legal obligations. 
These include obligations that arise from international investment 
law and international human rights law, as well as from domestic law 
and, when applicable, investor-state contracts. 
When it comes to investments in agriculture or forestry, two bodies 
of international law are especially important for host governments. 
International investment law, established primarily through bilateral 
investment treaties and other trade and investment treaties, regulates 
a host government’s treatment of foreign investors. Human rights law, 
codified in international instruments at the international or regional 
level, provides a set of rights that governments must seek to protect, 
respect, and fulfill. Traditionally, both investment law and human 
rights law create binding legal obligations for governments, but not for 
investors. In addition to international law, domestic law also creates 
legal obligations, generally for both governments and investors. When 




International investment law is a powerful force. Of the more than 
3,000 existing international investment treaties, most provide foreign 
investors with a direct private right of action to sue their “host” 
governments in international arbitration, generally without having to 
exhaust domestic remedies (i.e., first seek remedies under national law 
in a domestic court). Investor-state arbitration provides a relatively 
easy path to bring a legal challenge. If the government is found to 
have violated an investment treaty, the investment arbitration panel 
established to hear the dispute (typically three arbitrators) usually 
awards monetary damages, which may cover both past losses and lost 
future profits. Some awards have been for staggering sums—in 2014, 
for example, the Russian government was ordered to pay over US$50 
billion in compensation. Even if a government ultimately prevails in an 
arbitration, it may be forced to expend significant time and resources 
in defending the claim.28 Consequently, a government that is wary of 
arbitration claims may decline to address land grievances in a way that 
interferes with an investment, even in circumstances in which the public 
interest would justify or even require such interference.
International investment treaties may be relevant even when not 
anticipated by a host government, as corporations can sometimes 
maneuver to gain protection of an investment treaty that would 
otherwise not apply.29 Some investment arbitration tribunals have 
even permitted nationals of the host state to obtain treaty protection 
by “roundtripping”—i.e., establishing a corporate entity in a foreign 
country and routing investments from the host state through the foreign 
entity back to the host state.30 Complicating matters further, some 
tribunals have determined that even indirect and minority non-con-
trolling shareholders can initiate arbitrations, potentially exposing the 
government to multiple suits arising out of the same underlying issue.31 
Moreover, even if a company’s management or majority shareholders 
settle or decide to not bring a claim, other arbitrations may still be 
brought by minority shareholders in the company.
International investment treaties commonly contain a core set of 
obligations regulating governments’ conduct. These include:
 ö Two non-discrimination provisions, the national treatment obliga-
tion and the most-favored nation obligation, which prohibit inten-
tional discrimination against foreign investors on account of the 
investors’ nationality. According to some tribunals, these obligations 
also prevent unintentional discrimination. Some treaties apply these 
obligations on a pre-establishment basis, meaning that governments 
commit to granting protected investors rights to establish invest-
ments on the same terms as domestic individuals and entities (or  
any other foreign individual or entity).
Government measures that could trigger investment arbitration 
claims under the non-discrimination obligations include:
 » The provision of subsidies to domestic but not foreign-owned  
firms (intentional discrimination)
 » A regulation preventing foreigners from purchasing land  
(intentional discrimination)
 » The provision of subsidies to farms under a certain size  
(resulting in unintentional discrimination).
In addition, using the most-favored nation obligation, tribunals 
have allowed investors covered by a treaty between its home  
state and the host state to “import” favorable protections and dispute 
settlement provisions from other treaties concluded by the host state. 
This allows the investor to select the most investor-friendly aspects 
of different treaties, and bring those different aspects together to 
create a new “super-treaty” to protect the investor’s interests.
Importantly, some international investment treaties include excep-
tions to these non-discrimination obligations, which can be used for 
diverse policy aims. Such objectives might include preventing foreign 
ownership of certain investments and assets (for instance, land), or 
ensuring that governments can comply with other legal obligations 
(for example, permitting governments to accord special legal rights to 
indigenous peoples within their territories). Some governments have 
also included language in their international investment treaties clari-
fying that investors cannot use the most-favored nation obligation to 
“import” substantive standards from other investment treaties.
 ö The obligation to provide compensation for expropriations of  
an investor’s property.32 This has been interpreted to require govern-
ments to compensate for both direct expropriations, like outright 
seizure of property, and indirect expropriations, such as policy 
measures that destroy the economic value of an investment. While 
direct expropriations are relatively easy to identify, disputes often 
arise regarding whether a government regulation or other measure 
constitutes an “indirect” expropriation. Because it is difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate regulatory measures negatively 
affecting property rights and indirect expropriations, some more 
recent agreements have included additional text to guide tribunals  
on this point.
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Government measures that could trigger claims under the expropria-
tion provision include:
 » A regulation requiring that local communities be granted rights of 
transit across investors’ land
 » Measures restricting use of water
 » A court order invalidating an investor-state concession contract 
 
 ö The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation, which is the 
standard upon which investors most frequently prevail. Government 
conduct that lacks the severity necessary to amount to an expropria-
tion may still be deemed a violation of the FET obligation. Infamously 
vague, the FET obligation has been subject to a wide range of interpre-
tations that can be broken into two general groups. Under one, FET 
is a minimum standard of treatment that governments must provide 
to foreign investors; under the other, FET imposes more extensive 
procedural and substantive obligations, including to not frustrate or 
interfere with investors’ “legitimate expectations.”
Although this appears innocuous, the ways in which the FET obliga-
tion has been applied raise significant concerns for governments, and 
can affect the nature and scope of investor rights. For instance, some 
tribunals have interpreted it to allow investors to rely on and enforce 
otherwise non-binding statements by government officials.33 Govern-
ment conduct that interferes with an investor’s expectations gener-
ated by those non-binding statements can then result in liability. (Box 
5 provides one example of how an investment arbitration tribunal 
found that the government violated the investors’ “legitimate expecta-
tions” relating to their asserted property rights.)
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FET 
obligation include: 
 » Most actions that would also give rise to claims of expropriation  
or violations of non-discrimination obligations
 » A federal government representation that a land-based investment 
would be allowed, which later turned out to be untrue in light of 
local community opposition 
 ö The full protection and security (FPS) obligation, which provides 
foreign investors and investments a measure of protection against 
harms caused by non-governmental actors (and, according to some 
investment arbitration tribunals, government actors as well).  
Some tribunals have interpreted the FPS standard to protect against 
any harm, including harm caused by changes in the host govern-
ment’s legal framework. Other tribunals have interpreted the obliga-
tion more narrowly to protect only against physical harm. According 
to this narrower interpretation, governments are only required to 
exercise due diligence in providing foreign investors and their invest-
ments a normal, non-discriminatory level of police protection. Some 
more modern model agreements and treaties have specified that FPS 
only refers to protection against physical harm.34
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FPS 
standard include:
 » A failure to evict alleged trespassers or squatters from the  
investor’s land
 » A failure to stop protests interfering with the investor’s operations 
 ö The “umbrella clause,” which is more common in older investment 
treaties35 and varies in both its wording and interpretation. In some 
cases, and depending on the text and tribunal, umbrella clauses have 
been interpreted relatively narrowly, requiring a government to 
comply with written contractual obligations entered into with the 
foreign investor. In other cases, umbrella clauses have been inter-
preted more broadly, requiring a government to comply with any 
obligation it has assumed under domestic or international law that 
benefits the investor. According to some tribunals, an umbrella clause 
will only be breached if the government was acting in its “sovereign” 
capacity when it violated its obligation to the investor (for example, 
passing a law invalidating an underlying contract). The majority of 
tribunals, however, have found that a government can also breach 
the umbrella clause if it was acting as a normal contracting party (for 
example, failing to comply with its duty to make payments under  
the contract).
Government measures that could trigger claims under the 
umbrella clause include:
 » Efforts to seek renegotiation of an investor-state contract
 » A court decision that a stabilization clause in an investor-state 
contract is invalid
 » A government entity’s breach of its contractual obligations 
to the investor
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Under the FET obligation, some investor-state arbitration tribunals 
have effectively allowed investors to transform their “legitimate 
expectations” into enforceable property rights, even if such rights 
do not exist under domestic law. The Awdi v. Romania case,36 for 
example, centered on two decisions by the Constitutional Court 
of Romania, which had determined that property rights claimed by 
the investors regarding two discrete investments were invalid. The 
Court’s first decision had invalidated title to a piece of contested 
land; the second had found unconstitutional a national law granting 
the investors a 49-year concession for lands rented from various local 
governments. In a subsequent action brought by the investors against 
Romania under an investment treaty, the arbitration tribunal did 
not find fault with the Constitutional Court’s process or decisions. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal determined that the investors’ legitimate 
expectations had been breached and must be compensated. In this 
way, the Constitutional Court’s authoritative determination over 
the validity of the property rights under domestic law resulted in 
a breach of the government’s FET obligation. Romania was thus 
ordered to compensate the investors €7.7 million for damages,  
with additional payments to cover the investors’ legal fees and 
related expenses.
BOX 5: TURNING EXPECTATIONS INTO PROPERTY RIGHTS:  
THE AWDI V. ROMANIA CASE
Each of the obligations described above has ramifications for the gov-
ernance of existing land-based investments and governments’ options 
for addressing related grievances. Despite these implications, however, 
it is difficult—and arguably inappropriate (see Box 10)—for host states 
to shape their conduct in a way that fully avoids all potential risks. 
Investment arbitration tribunals are not bound to follow the decisions 
of previous cases, which means that tribunals in pending and future 
cases have broad latitude to adopt different interpretations. This lack of 
precedent, coupled with vague treaty language and differing interpreta-
tions by arbitration tribunals, renders it difficult to declare definitively 
what any one obligation requires. Thus, assessing in advance what types 
of conduct will and will not give rise to claims of breach is a nearly 
impossible task, and predicting whether those claims will be successful 
can be equally challenging.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN  
RIGHTS LAW
In the context of land-based investments, international human rights 
law and the obligations thereunder will often create countervailing 
pressures for governments. Whereas international investment law 
obliges governments to provide certain protections to investors, 
international human rights law sets out protections for individuals 
and peoples, including those who risk being negatively affected by 
investments.37 Compared to international investment law, human rights 
law is far less fragmented: rather than the thousands of investment 
treaties, there are fewer than a dozen core human rights treaties at 
the international level,38 supplemented by other relevant multilateral 
treaties (such as International Labour Organization Conventions)39 
and regional human rights treaties in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. 
Instead of the dispute-specific tribunals created under investment 
treaties, human rights redress mechanisms are provided through more 
established forums. These include regional human rights courts,  
regional human rights commissions, and complaints mechanisms tied to 
specific treaties.
These human rights fora differ from investment arbitration processes 
in two important ways. They generally require claimants to first exhaust 
available domestic remedies. In addition, the remedies awarded by 
human rights tribunals are not usually in the form of monetary damages; 
even when monetary awards are provided, the high sums seen in invest-
ment law disputes are not common in human rights judgments.41
States that have ratified human rights treaties have corresponding 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights codified 
therein.42 Specifically, this means that they must refrain from violating 
those rights, prevent third parties from violating those rights, and take 
steps to progressively realize those rights (this latter point is generally 
more applicable to economic, social, and cultural rights). In addition 
to binding treaties, soft law instruments, such as U.N. declarations and 
widely endorsed guidelines, help in interpreting human rights law.
The human rights most commonly affected by land-based investments 
can be loosely grouped into three categories: human rights tied to land 
occupation and use; other human rights at risk for those living on, near, 
or downstream from concession areas; and human rights of employees 
and contractors. These include:
 ö The right to property, which includes the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of property. This right can generally be limited for actions 
that are “in the public interest.” Whether a land-based investment can 
be considered in the public interest may depend on the context and 
jurisdiction, as described in Box 17.
 ö The prohibition of forced eviction, which forbids the coerced or 
involuntary displacement of individuals or communities from their 
home or lands without appropriate protection. A government that 
undertakes or fails to prevent forced evictions related to a land-based 
investment may violate a range of legally protected human rights, 
including the right to adequate housing.43
 ö The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), which 
requires governments to consult and cooperate in good faith with 
indigenous peoples to obtain their FPIC before: relocating them; 
approving any project affecting their lands, territories, or resources; or 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that 
may affect them. Government measures that violate this right include 
allowing a land-based investment to displace indigenous peoples 
without their consent, regardless of whether such peoples hold formal 
title to the land. Such an action might also violate the right of minor-
ities to enjoy their own culture, which includes protections of land 
use or ownership where the culture is closely tied to the land.
 ö The right to water, which protects individuals’ access to existing water 
supplies, and includes the right to be free from interference, such as 
from arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. A 
land-based investment that diverts or pollutes water relied on by local 
individuals or communities thus might give rise to a violation of their 
right to water.
 ö The right to food, which is realized when an individual has uninter-
rupted physical and economic access to adequate food, or to the means 
for procuring adequate food, such as access to land and other produc-
tive resources. When a government allows an investor to displace 
people from land on which they had relied for access to food, it is 
failing protect the right to food.
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BOX 6: RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TIED TO EVICTIONS:  
THE ENDOROIS CASE 
This decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights concerned the Kenyan government’s eviction of hundreds 
of families belonging to the indigenous Endorois people from 
their ancestral lands to create game reserves for tourism, and to 
grant concessions for forestry and mining.40 The Endorois were 
not properly consulted or compensated, and were prevented from 
accessing the land and resources needed for traditional medicines. 
The Commission found that the government had violated the 
community’s rights to religion and culture by restricting access to 
the land and impeding the Endorois’ traditional pastoralist way 
of life. The community’s right to property, and its right to freely 
dispose of its wealth and natural resources, were also found to 
have been violated by restricting the Endorois’ access to the land 
and resources. Finally, the Commission found that the government 
violated the community’s right to development, given the commu-
nity’s lack of involvement in the process of developing the region 
for tourism.  The Commission recommended that the government 
recognize the Endorois’ ownership of the land, and return the land 
to them. It also recommended that the government pay compensa-
tion for additional losses, and ensure that the community benefit 
from any royalties and employment opportunities generated from 
existing economic activities on the land.
 ö The right to health, which contains both entitlements and freedoms, 
such as the right to control one’s health and body, and the right to 
be free from interference. A land-based investment that directly or 
indirectly contributes to poor health can affect this right for workers 
or local communities. Such practices might also affect their right to a 
healthy environment, which includes the right to live in an environ-
ment adequate for health and wellbeing.
 ö The right to self-determination, which includes the right of peoples 
to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. Land-based 
investments that deprive peoples of their access to productive 
resources might infringe on this right.
 ö The right to life, which must be protected by law, and the right to 
liberty and security of person, which prohibits arbitrary arrest or 
detention. In addition, there is a right to peaceful assembly, which 
includes the right to participate in peaceful meetings or protests, 
as well as the right to freedom of expression, which covers the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information (including a right 
of access to information held by public bodies). In the context of 
land-based investments, these rights are sometimes at risk when the 
government or private security forces respond to efforts by commu-
nity members or land rights defenders to draw attention to negative 
impacts of an investment.
 ö The right to just and favorable conditions of work, which includes 
requirements for fair wages and safe and healthy working conditions. 
Additionally, the right to form and join trade unions and the right 
to freedom of association cover workers’ rights to join unions to 
protect their interests. In some contexts, a government might fail  
to ensure that these rights are respected in the operation of 
land-based investments. 
Government obligations related to these rights also have important 
implications for how governments address land grievances. While the 
content of many of these human rights and corresponding govern-
mental obligations are subject to fewer divergences in interpretation 
than in investment law, there remains confusion on the part of some 
government entities about what these rights require. The right to food, 
for example, does not equate to a general right to be fed, but it does 
require a government to refrain from interfering with existing access 
to food (or the resources used to obtain it) and to prevent third parties 
from doing so. Thus, a more thorough understanding of what such 
obligations entail can help governments in addressing grievances in a 
way that complies with their legal obligations under human rights law.
DOMESTIC  
LAW
Domestic laws and regulations are also relevant for host governments 
seeking to take action on land grievances. These domestic legal frame-
works shape how land-based investments are undertaken and regulated, 
providing processes and rules to be followed. For instance, a law might 
describe the incentives to be offered to investors, prevent foreigners 
from purchasing certain types of land, or set out the authorizations 
required to receive a forestry permit. Individuals claiming breach of a 
domestic law generally seek redress through domestic courts. A court 
might, for example, assess the legality of a land concession under 
domestic law.
Depending on the jurisdiction, there may be specific laws regulating 
investments or protecting human rights. Some of these laws provide 
greater protection—of investments, or of human rights—than at the 
international level. For example, a domestic investment law might 
expand the opportunities for investment dispute procedures beyond 
what an investor would receive under an applicable investment treaty. 
In turn, a domestic human rights law might set forth more specific 
obligations that a government must follow. One distinction from inter-
national law is that domestic law frequently also creates obligations for 
investors, rather than just for governments.
INVESTOR-STATE  
CONTRACTS
In countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise grants 
access to land for agricultural or forestry projects, investor-state 
contracts may be used. These contracts allocate risk between 
contracting parties and delineate a range of rights and obligations. 
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BOX 7: OTHER INTERNATIONAL  
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
In addition to obligations under investment law and human rights 
law, governments have obligations under other types of interna-
tional law, such as international environmental law and inter-
national humanitarian law, which might in some cases affect 
resolution of a land grievance. For example:
 ö States party to the Convention on Biological Diversity are bound 
to respect and maintain environmentally beneficial knowl-
edge, innovations and practices of indigenous and other local 
communities practicing traditional lifestyles, and to do so with 
their approval and involvement.
 ö Individuals displaced during armed conflict have a right to 
voluntary return in safety, with the government’s assistance, 
to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the 
reasons for their displacement cease to exist. The property of 
displaced individuals, and of civilians more generally, must not 
be destroyed or appropriated as part of a reprisal or collective 
punishment.44
 ö During armed conflict, governments must protect cultural 
property (defined as “movable or immovable property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people”), which can 
include archaeological sites, such as indigenous burial sites and 
places of worship.45
BOX 8: ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURT:  
EXAMPLE FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA
In 2012, a Malaysian investor acquired, through acquisitions of 
another company, two Special Agriculture & Business Leases 
in Papua New Guinea for over 38,000 hectares of land, which it 
planned to use for oil palm plantations.46 Communities protested 
these plans, and claimed that they were customary owners of the 
land in question. Plaintiffs representing the affected communities 
sought judicial review of the leases, claiming that the procedures 
established by law to obtain the leases were not followed.47 The 
National Court of Papua New Guinea issued an interim injunction 
restraining activities on the land, and the leases were subsequently 
quashed. The investor stated in an announcement that it would 
comply with the related Order, and also noted that “without the 
acceptance and co-operation of the customary land owners …, 
there will be no end to challenges over [its] right to operate ….”48
Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their 
purported comprehensiveness.
Investor-state contracts sometimes include a stabilization clause 
addressing how changes in the law of the host state will affect the 
contract. Stabilization clauses can be framed broadly, as applying to 
all domestic laws, or narrowly, applying only to certain topics (for 
example, tax laws). There are three general categories of  
stabilization clauses:
 ö Freezing clauses specify that the law in effect on the day that a 
contract is signed will apply to the investment for the life of the 
project regardless of any subsequent changes in law.
 ö Economic equilibrium clauses require an investor to comply with 
new laws, but oblige the host state to compensate the investor for 
any loss incurred in doing so.
 ö Hybrid clauses are a combination of freezing clauses and  
economic equilibrium clauses.49
Although stabilization clauses are discouraged by the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises,50 some investors continue to seek them 
in the hopes of insulating the investment from unpredictable and costly 
changes in domestic laws. As explained below, such clauses interact 
with international investment law and international human rights law 
in various ways.
Investor-state contracts generally define the process to be used in 
addressing disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract. 
Many provide for commercial arbitration under the same or similar 
rules that govern arbitration arising out of investment treaties; as with 
investment arbitration, these commercial arbitrations often occur 
outside of the host country. Thus, while only an investor can bring a 
claim for breach of an investment treaty obligation, either the investor 
or the government can bring a claim under commercial arbitration for 
breach of a contractual obligation.
INTERACTION BETWEEN  
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
Governments’ legal obligations interact in complex ways, and can 
even conflict with each other. For example, investor-state contracts 
are generally subordinate to domestic law, but can be essentially 
elevated above domestic law by an international investment treaty. 
Investment treaties have also been interpreted in a way that 
effectively creates new property rights that might not exist under 
domestic law. At the same time, an investor-state contract can 
potentially create obligations that conflict with a government’s obli-
gations under international human rights law, while a government’s 
obligations under an investment treaty and under relevant human 
rights treaties may also be in tension.
Governments’ obligations under these different legal frameworks and 
agreements interact in various and complex ways. They may, at times, 
also conflict.
Investor-state contracts, for example, are generally subordinate to 
domestic law. However, to the extent that a stabilization clause has 
been included in the contract, the contracting parties seek to circum-
vent relevant changes in the domestic law, excepting the investor from 
having to comply with or incur the costs of those changes. This may be 
acceptable in some jurisdictions. Yet it may not be allowed in others, 
where a court might deem such a clause to be invalid and unenforce-
able on grounds that it violates the constitutional separation of powers 
or improperly restricts the government’s power to act in the public 
interest. Additionally, investor-state contracts may seek to create a 
particular legal regime that differs from what would originally apply 
under domestic law. Some contracts, for example, provide for particular 
methods of dispute settlement, and purport to impose specialized rules 
on available remedies. As with stabilization provisions, the enforcea-
bility of such provisions traditionally depends on the domestic law that 
governs the contract (which is often, but not necessarily, the law of the 
host state).
The rise of international investment treaties, however, has compli-
cated the role of domestic law. One effect of these treaties is to elevate 
states’ contractual commitments to investors to the international law 
level, placing those commitments above—rather than subordinate 
to—domestic law. Thus, even if a domestic court deems a stabilization 
clause or other contractual provision invalid, an investment arbitration 
tribunal asked to interpret the investor-state contract may adopt a 
different view, holding the government to those promises and enforcing 
them under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treatment 
obligation. In this way, the presence of an international investment 
treaty can potentially shield a contractual clause from challenges that, 
under domestic law, might have been successful.
Moreover, international investment treaties have been interpreted in 
a way that effectively creates new property rights that might not exist 
under domestic law. In evaluating whether the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard was breached, some investment arbitration tribunals 
have determined that investors’ rights and mere “legitimate expec-
tations” are protected against subsequent government interference. 
Under this reasoning, even if a tribunal determined that the investor 
did not possess a valid property right or authorization under domestic 
law, it could still conclude that the investor had formed “expectations” 
that should be protected. This essentially turns these expectations into 
new and enforceable property rights. Such an interpretation differs 
from the traditional approach under international law, which recog-
nizes the power of domestic systems to define whether and to what 
extent a property right exists.
Astoundingly, an international investment treaty can potentially 
protect an entire investor-state contract (or provisions in that 
contract) that might otherwise be deemed illegal or unenforceable 
under domestic law. This is less likely when the illegal nature of the 
contract is severe: some tribunals, for example, have determined that 
they do not have the power to hear claims brought by investors that 
have secured their contracts through corruption or fraud. Yet tribunals 
have been less likely to dismiss cases in which contracts are illegal 
on other grounds—for example, if the government entity that signed 
the contract did not have the authority to do so, or if the process of 
entering into the contract did not comply with necessary requirements 
established by domestic law.51
Even in the absence of a stabilization clause in an investor-state 
contract, some investment arbitration tribunals have determined  
that promises of legal stability can be inferred from the fact that, when 
the investor and government entered into their contract, the deal was 
governed by a particular legal framework. Changes to that framework 
could then, according to these tribunals, give rise to a violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment obligation. In such a situation, an inter-
national investment treaty may also have the effect of shielding an 
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investor from complying with, or requiring the government to  
provide compensation for the costs of, changes in the legal framework 
that negatively affect the investor, even without the parties having 
explicitly agreed that the government would provide the investor  
such protections.
International investment treaties are typically asymmetrical (creating 
protections for investors and corresponding obligations for govern-
ments), and therefore do not have a similar impact on investors’ 
contractual commitments to governments. One example is found in the 
context of renegotiation of investor-state contracts. Due to invest-
ment arbitration tribunal decisions interpreting the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation as requiring governments to protect investors’ 
“legitimate expectations,” and the umbrella clause’s mandate that host 
states abide by commitments made to foreign investors, host govern-
ments may be constrained in their ability to seek renegotiation. In 
contrast, investors retain more freedom to request renegotiations—or 
to resist renegotiation attempts by states—without incurring liability 
under international law.
Given that international and regional human rights treaties are not 
principally concerned with the protection of investment, they generally 
do not affect commitments in investor-state contracts as investment 
treaties do.52 Yet international human rights law and investor-state 
contracts can potentially create conflicting obligations for govern-
ments. For example, a contract granting a concession that displaces 
land users and violates their rights to food or housing would place the 
government’s human rights obligations in conflict with its contrac-
tual obligations. Similarly, a broadly framed stabilization clause in an 
investor-state contract may be in tension with a government’s human 
rights obligations to the extent that the clause limits the applicability to 
the underlying investment of new laws or policies necessary to respect, 
protect, or fulfill human rights.53 When a government is party to an 
investment treaty relevant for the investment, the treaty can create 
an additional potential conflict, between the government’s obliga-
tions under the investment treaty and under relevant human  
rights treaties.
This web of international, domestic, and contractual legal obliga-
tions can pose difficulties for governments seeking to assess their 
full set of obligations, as well as to take actions to address land 
grievances in a manner that complies with their relevant obligations. 
To date, international tribunals have not provided much assistance 
in resolving potential conflicts, tending either to avoid finding that 
a conflict exists or to resolve a dispute based only on one set of legal 
obligations, as noted in Box 9.
UNDERSTANDING LEGAL OBLIGATIONS  
IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND GRIEVANCES
Governments’ legal obligations are relevant in their efforts to 
redress land grievances. As they navigate the options at their 
disposal, governments should take into account the full range of 
their legal obligations.
The obligations that bind governments under these various legal 
regimes and agreements raise the specter of non-compliance or 
potential liability stemming from certain actions, which governments 
may see as constraining their options. Two examples from different 
stages in the project cycle highlight how governments’ obligations 
may arise and conflict in their pursuit of addressing land grievances.
As described above, many grievances precipitated by land-based 
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Few human rights courts, tribunals, or expert bodies have addressed 
how a conflict between a state’s human rights obligations and its 
obligations under an international investment treaty should be deter-
mined. One notable exception, however, is found in the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights’ decision in the case of Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (March 2006). That case focused 
on Paraguay’s failure to resolve a legal claim by the Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua people over the 
community’s ancestral lands, which had been sold by the government 
to foreign investors. Paraguay argued that the land had been bought 
by a German national, whose interest in the land was protected by a 
“bilateral treaty”54 between Paraguay and Germany. While the Court 
rejected that argument on procedural grounds, it also offered two 
alternative justifications for upholding the community’s rights to 
the land even when a bilateral investment treaty might be operative. 
The Court’s first alternative rationale was that the bilateral invest-
ment treaty allowed for expropriation of capital investments where 
necessary for a public purpose, and such a purpose could include the 
restitution of ancestral land to an indigenous community. Its second 
alternative rationale involved holding that the bilateral and reciprocal 
nature of the investment treaty rendered it inferior to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, asserting that the enforcement of 
“bilateral commercial treaties … should always be compatible with 
the American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human 
rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for 
individual human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity 
among States.”55
Investment arbitration tribunals have also generally avoided 
addressing conflicts between a state’s obligations under human 
rights treaties and an investment treaty. While host governments 
and amicus curiae have made submissions to investment arbitra-
tion tribunals asking that a government’s human rights obligations 
be taken into account when assessing the scope of its obligations 
and potential liabilities to foreign investors, tribunals have tended 
to dismiss such arguments rather summarily. This includes by not 
engaging with the arguments at all, by determining that human  
rights were not in fact at risk, and/or by concluding that the govern-
ment’s obligations to protect and fulfill human rights did not excuse 
its obligations to comply with investment treaty commitments. 
As the field of international investment law continues to evolve, 
however, future investor-state arbitration decisions may give more 
weight to, and become more thorough in their treatment of, human 
rights arguments.
BOX 9: HOW INTERNATIONAL BODIES HAVE TREATED CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
INVESTOR PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
investments arise from displacement from land, whether forcible  
or voluntary, and the negative consequences of such displacement. 
These grievances can emerge before any displacement actually 
occurs—for example, when those who stand to be displaced learn 
about a project during a survey of the land taken after the inves-
tor-state contract has been signed. When the grievances are lodged, 
the government may realize that the planned investment would cause 
it to violate its obligations to respect or protect the human rights of 
those who would be displaced, such as their rights to property, food, 
water, or housing.
A government might then decide to ask the investor to first receive 
the consent of potentially displaced communities before the project 
proceeds. Such a request could help assuage community grievances 
while also helping the government to comply with its human rights 
obligations. However, the terms of the investor-state contract may 
have warranted that the government was providing unencumbered 
land, and may have allocated sole responsibility to the government to 
resettle any settlements on the concession land that impede investor 
operations. If the investor thus refuses to seek community consent, or 
insists that the government must resettle individuals or communities 
on the land regardless of their grievances, the government may be 
limited by its contractual obligations in its options for response. If a 
government nevertheless attempts to force the investor to obtain such 
consent, the investor may raise arguments that such actions breach 
the contract and/or obligations under an investment treaty.56 In such  
a case, the government may find that its obligations under human 
rights law, international investment law, and the contract are not  
easy to reconcile.
Another common grievance tied to land-based investments relates 
to jobs, including the creation of relatively few jobs compared to the 
number promised or expected. A government concerned about 
addressing these grievances might consider various strategies 
for maximizing job creation, such as adopting an export ban on 
non-processed timber to generate greater employment through local 
processing. If investors have entered into timber contracts with the 
government that include a broad stabilization clause or explicitly 
provide rights to export non-processed timber, however, the new 
export ban might not apply to those investors and therefore may 
be of limited use. A government that nevertheless tried to enforce 
such an export ban vis-à-vis such investors might be in violation of 
its contractual obligations or investment treaty obligations. In such 
a situation, an investor protected by an investment treaty could, 
depending on the treaty language, potentially bring a claim under 
a fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, or other applicable 
provision. Moreover, investors in forestry operations might not 
be the only corporate actors seeking an investment treaty claim 
related to the export ban. For instance, the imposition of such a law 
might give rise to a claim from traders who had invested in the host 
country to sell non-processed timber to an export market, while 
foreign processors in the host country might sue the government if 
the export ban were subsequently lifted.
Understanding a government’s legal obligations in the context 
of land-based investments helps in assessing its potential options 
to address grievances arising from those investments. While there 
are multiple options that governments can take to address such 
grievances, not every option is appropriate for a given situation. 
Further, a government may find that it is at times useful to under-
take more than one option to address certain situations—for 
example, reshaping concession boundaries in order to restitute land 
to affected persons.
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When governments take action in the public interest, for example, 
to strengthen environmental and labor laws or to regulate the use of 
property rights, those actions are frequently challenged in domestic 
courts by private individuals or entities as violating contractual 
commitments, domestic laws, regulations, or constitutional require-
ments. Yet the fact that a challenge has been brought does not mean 
that the government’s action was illegitimate, nor that the govern-
ment should not have taken that action. Rather, such challenges are a 
cost of allowing private actors to hold governments accountable for 
violations of the law. Governments, however, can regulate the flow 
and implications of such challenges through rules on who may sue, 
on what grounds, and for what remedies.
International investment treaties provide foreign investors with 
another route to challenge government action that can be used 
instead of, and even in addition to, challenges under domestic law. As 
long as investment treaties exist in their present form, it will be diffi-
cult if not impossible for governments to avoid claims challenging 
even good faith actions taken to address public interest issues.  
This report highlights the risks that arise under investment treaties in 
order to provide insights into what types of conduct toward investors 
are more or less likely to trigger claims and liability, as well as to help 
inform treaty policy moving forward. The discussion of investment 
treaties, however, is not meant to counsel governments against 
taking good faith actions designed to address land grievances or 
comply with human rights obligations based on the concern that, by 
doing so, they may face claims or liability under investment treaties.
BOX 10: ACTING IN  





Although land-based investments can provoke a range of grievances from local individuals or commu-
nities, a host government’s competing obligations under different legal frameworks may constrain or 
influence its efforts to address such grievances. Pragmatic concerns and political considerations may also 
factor into a government’s decision on how to respond: some actions may not give rise to legal liability but 
could still potentially result in sub-optimal outcomes by, for instance, exacerbating tensions or damaging 
a country’s reputation. 
Furthermore, while there are a number of options at the disposal of a government seeking to address 
land grievances, many of these options may not fully satisfy the concerns raised by communities, or may 
not be appropriate for the situation at hand. A government thus must be careful both in selecting its plan 
of action and in implementing it, taking steps to do so in a way that adequately manages the problems 
while minimizing any potential liability or unnecessary repercussions.
20 Land deal dilemmas: Grievances, human rights, and investor protections
A government that hosts land-based investments may need to confront 
immediate complaints that require specific action, or may anticipate 
the need to address grievances in the future. Part III of this report 
first explores the specific actions that a host government can take 
when distinct grievances are triggered by a particular investment or 
investor, before turning to general options for governments seeking to 
improve their overarching approach to addressing land grievances or to 
minimize their liability under international investment treaties. Each 
of the options explored below has its own set of advantages, risks, and 
accompanying considerations. While these options do not comprise an 
exhaustive list, they cover an array of steps that a government could 
take in the context of actual or potential land grievances.
SPECIFIC  
OPTIONS
When actual grievances are triggered by land-based investments, 
host governments will need to take specific steps to address those 
grievances. Although various options exist, many of them may raise 
potential problems, by creating liability under investment law or 
inflaming already existing tensions among local community members. 
Governments considering their options should therefore be aware of 
the risks related to each action, and should take care in designing their 
approach. Awareness of the benefits, drawbacks, and risks can support 
governments in making informed and appropriate decisions.
REQUESTING  
INVESTOR ACTION
A government can ask an investor to modify its actual or planned 
operations to help address related grievances. When the investor 
is exercising rights given to it under a contract, license, or other 
authorization, such a request would be for voluntary action. While 
this may create some risks for the government, there are pragmatic 
reasons why an investor might comply.
A government seeking to redress land grievances may consider asking 
an investor to change its actual or planned operations. This could 
include, for example, a request that the investor gain the free, prior, 
and informed consent of land users before expanding its operations 
into new parts of the concession area. When the investment and its 
operations do not run contrary to domestic laws or the relevant inves-
tor-state contract, this would be a request that the investor comply 
voluntarily. There are pragmatic and political reasons why an investor 
might be inclined to consider such requests.
WHAT TYPE OF REQUESTS  
MIGHT A GOVERNMENT MAKE?
At times, an investor may be acting legally and within the scope of its 
contract or other applicable authorization, even when its operations 
lead to legitimate grievances or have negative human rights impacts. 
While the government may find it politically difficult to compel changes 
in this situation, it could request that the investor voluntarily change 
or modify its operations. For example, a government could consider 
asking an investor to not commence new operations on land within 
the concession area until receiving permission from or reaching an 
agreement with any affected persons. This is a tricky position when the 
government has already contracted with the investor to allow use of the 
land.57 Such a strategy thus has risks, yet there are also reasons why an 
investor might be likely to agree, as discussed below.
WHY MIGHT AN INVESTOR  
WANT TO COMPLY?
Even when an investor is operating within the scope of a relevant in-
vestor-state contract, and thus not contractually obligated to change its 
practices or to take steps to address grievances, there may be practical 
reasons for doing so. In some contexts, a “social license to operate” 
may be as important as the legal contract for ensuring a favorable
operating environment. Conflicts over land tenure, meanwhile, sig-
nificantly increase financial risks for investors, with estimates ranging 
from operating costs increased by “as much as 29 times … to outright 
abandonment of an up-and-running operation.”58 Seeking to gain or 
maintain a social license to operate, and particularly to address land 
tenure conflicts, may be the most prudent financial step a company can 
take when grievances start to arise.
In addition, an investor may have other relevant commitments, 
such as through certification bodies or its own company policies, that 
would encourage it to comply with government requests to assist in 
addressing land grievances. For example, a palm oil company that is 
certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) must 
meet the standards set out in the RSPO Principles and Criteria, which 
include that the company’s land use “does not diminish the legal, 
customary or user rights of other users without their free, prior and 
informed consent.”59 The RSPO provides indicators to assess whether 
this was upheld, as well as guidance on the steps companies must 
take in respect of FPIC. Indeed, the body has ordered companies to 
suspend land-clearing work until complaints related to FPIC have been 
resolved.60 The voluntary commitments of buyers may also be relevant 
considerations for an investor; for example, Bonsucro, the sustain-
able sugarcane organization, has suspended an agribusiness company 
purchasing sugar produced on concessions with contested land.61 These 
external commitments may align with requests made by the govern-
ment to take actions that would address grievances. 
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BOX 11: LIBERIA: PREDICATING EXPANSION WITHIN 
CONCESSION LAND ON COMMUNITY APPROVAL?
In Liberia, a country with a number of large-scale agricultural 
and forestry concessions covering a significant swath of the 
country’s land, grievances have arisen as investors seek to expand 
operations within concession areas onto land claimed by commu-
nities. These grievances have led to conflict, violence, advocacy 
campaigns against the investors, a request from an outside 
certification body to halt further expansion while complaints were 
investigated, and, in one case, a commitment by the President 
that no further expansion of operations would occur without the 
affected community’s approval.62
This commitment was unexpected, provided during a meeting 
with communities concerned about the investor’s efforts to 
expand palm oil production onto their customary lands. The 
relevant concession agreements, however, which arguably covered 
the land in question, provided no recognition of customary owner-
ship rights, excepting tribal reserves of land.63 While the story is 
still playing out, this is a particularly interesting example of how a 
government has sought to balance community rights in respect of 
planned expansion within a concession area.
Further, an investor’s own policies might require respect for 
human rights, and an investor seeking to comply with the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights may have already 
undertaken human rights due diligence or other steps to ensure 
that its operations are rights-compliant. A government’s request to 
modify operations to better comply with human rights would thus 
be compatible with the investor’s internal policies, and a refusal to 
do so may pose reputational or other risks.
HOW WOULD REQUESTING  
INVESTOR ACTION HELP?
Requesting investor action may be a pragmatic way to find 
solutions for grievances. For example, an investor may be better 
placed to address grievances stemming from concerns that it had 
not delivered promised benefits, which the community may have 
expected even if the investor was not contractually obligated to 
provide them.
If an investor agrees to take certain requested actions, this could 
help redress grievances while avoiding a need to renegotiate or end 
the investment. Voluntary investor action in this manner may help 
make the investment more sustainable in the long run.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS RELATED TO  
REQUESTING INVESTOR ACTION?
A request by the government for the investor to take, or refrain 
from taking, certain actions is likely permissible under international 
law. Some investment arbitration tribunals, however, have found 
governments liable for efforts to force or pressure investors into 
giving up their contractual rights.
Depending on the request, or how frequently a government makes 
such requests, this strategy may pose reputational risks for the 
country. While a government should not be faulted for taking steps 
to protect the rights of its citizens, repeated requests that are taken 
as demands contravening a relevant investment agreement could 
make potential investors wary.
Yet another risk of this strategy arises from its dependence on the 
voluntary actions of the investor. This strategy might not be appro-
priate when the government needs to ensure that the investor takes 
or refrains from taking certain actions, such as when the grievances 
relate to human rights abuses. It also might not be appropriate 
when grievances require more comprehensive solutions involving 
more than one investor. In these cases, other options might be more 
suitable, such as renegotiating a contract or adopting changes in the 
law (both discussed below).
WHEN IS THIS 
OPTION APPROPRIATE?
Requesting investor action may be appropriate when grievances are 
the result of operations that are not technically violations of the 
law or the investor-state contract. (To the extent that operations 
violate law or contractual obligations, the government has much 
greater scope to force the investor to take remedial actions.) This 
option is also a sensible approach when the grievance could be more 
effectively resolved by the investor than by the government.
Legal or reputational risk might be mitigated when the investor 
agrees that the requested action would make good business sense 
or aligns with standards to which it has already committed, whether 
voluntary or binding in nature.
SHAPING OR RESHAPING  
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES
In limited contexts, a government may be bound by an investment 
contract that does not explicitly delineate the specific boundaries 
of the land the investor will use. In this case, the government may 
be able to shape concession boundaries in a way that minimizes 
negative impacts on local communities and thus reduces grievances. 
Additionally, even when the concession boundaries have already 
been established, a government may seek to reshape the bounda-
ries to help address grievances over land allocation.
A government that has already entered into an investor-state contract 
may be in a position to shape—or may seek to “reshape”—the specific 
boundaries of the concession to address grievances tied to the 
allocation of land to an investor. Shaping the boundaries could occur 
when the government and investor have entered into an agreement 
for land use without well-defined boundaries for the area to be used. 
The window of opportunity for this approach is generally limited, with 
some space for maneuvering after a contract has been concluded but 
before the concession boundaries have been delineated. Reshaping the 
boundaries, on the other hand, could occur at any point during the term 
of the contract.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “SHAPING”  
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?
Investor-state contracts for land-based investments often set out 
the area allocated to the investor for use. Some contracts provide 
extremely specific information on the area boundaries, such as a long 
list of geographic coordinates or a detailed explanation of the physical 
boundaries. Other contracts provide more general information on 
the area boundaries, noting, for example, that the investor is to lease 
a certain number of hectares in specified areas or sub-divisions (for 
example, sectors or districts). In this case, the contracting parties may 
have agreed to a map or site plan of the concession area that provides 
more concrete details, which is generally provided in an annex to the 
contract and considered to be part of the agreement.
In some situations, however, an investor-state contract may have 
been concluded without explicit agreement on the final area to be used 
by the investor for operations under the agreement. This may have been 
a deliberate effort to help avoid the use of land that is already claimed, 
or it may have been incorporated in a contract for other reasons. In 
such cases, the contract may simply provide approximate amounts 
of hectares and general locations. When this occurs, national law or 
policies may provide a more explicit process to define the boundaries of 
land that can be used,64 or the contract itself may describe the process 
that will be followed.65 Such a process opens up the possibility for the 
government to try to minimize negative impacts, when, for example, 
new information appears after the contract’s conclusion, but before 
the final delineation of boundaries, that illustrates the potential for 
grievances to arise.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “RESHAPING”  
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?
Even after the boundaries of a concession have been delineated, 
there may still be some scope for the government and the investor 
to “reshape” those boundaries. In practice, many large concessions 
provide much more land than is necessary for operations, and an 
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investor may not intend to use all of its allocated land.66 Indeed, in 
the course of operations, some investors identify parcels of land that 
they do not intend to use, even though they may be entitled through 
their contract to operate on it.67 Particularly if an investor has already 
planned to not use some land within the concession area, this may open 
up an opportunity for the government to ask the investor to reshape 
the concession boundaries by explicitly carving out certain parts of the 
concession area.68
Reshaping specific concession boundaries could be predicated on the 
provision of alternative land, or instead with the understanding that 
it would narrow the total amount of land available. When reshaping 
would require carving out or swapping a substantial amount of land, 
a government and investor may decide that a full renegotiation of 
the investor-state contract is necessary. In other cases, this could be 
documented through a side letter, or through a simple amendment to 
the contract or to the contract’s relevant exhibit defining the conces-
sion area.69
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF SHAPING OR RESHAPING  
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?
When a government has the opportunity to shape concession bound-
aries as described above, this strategy may help to delineate areas in 
a way that avoids or mitigates negative impacts. Doing so presents an 
opportunity for a government to address actual or potential grievances 
about which it may not have been aware or concerned at the time of 
the contract negotiations, or that have arisen, for example, during the 
survey process. Careful upfront work in shaping boundaries can also 
help the government avoid the need to seek a negotiation of a contract 
amendment, or even a renegotiation of the contract. This helps protect 
the government’s interests, as such an amendment may require 
the government to give up other points in return, while pressure to 
renegotiate concession boundaries after an investor-state contract has 
been entered into may create risks related to government obligations 
under an investment treaty. In addition, efforts to shape boundaries 
with an eye to minimizing grievances may also appeal to the investor, as 
a careful delineation could help prevent future community conflicts and 
avoidable risks.
Even after the concession area has been selected, a government 
and investor may find it prudent to reshape the boundaries.70 If use 
of certain parts of the concession area is strongly contested, carving 
such parts out (with or without additional land to replace it) may help 
reduce investor-community conflict and ensure the sustainability of 
the investment’s general operations. Particularly if the land tied to 
the grievances is unlikely to be used by the investor, relinquishing it 
can help address both operational and reputational risks with minimal 
impact on the investor. Investors may also be interested in this 
approach to the extent that ceding land reduces rental fees (where 
fees are paid on the entire concession area), or helps ensure compli-
ance with development commitments (when the contract obliges the 
investor to develop a certain percentage of the land by a certain date).
Undertaking efforts to shape or reshape concession boundaries also 
creates the opportunity to seek and obtain the free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) of potentially affected individuals or communities. 
Doing so may be required of the government or investor in some 
cases. Even when not required, a proper FPIC process constitutes best 
practice and helps to reduce avoidable risks. Among other benefits, 
obtaining FPIC, and undertaking community consultation more 
generally, provides useful insight for the government and investor on 
how best to shape or reshape boundaries to minimize future problems 
while also diminishing existing tensions by demonstrating respect for 
peoples’ land and their claims to that land.
WHAT POTENTIAL RISKS  
ARISE FROM THIS STRATEGY?
One risk related to shaping boundaries may simply be that the narrow 
situations in which this option applies reduce the likelihood that a 
government would be aware of potential grievances in time to take 
appropriate steps. Another risk is that the government may not have 
sufficient scope within the established process to shape the boundaries 
in a way that fully respects the rights of individuals or communities that 
stand to be affected. For example, the scale of the land promised might 
be so vast that the government is unable to find a sufficient amount 
that is truly unencumbered and does not require displacement of com-
munities. The investor-state contract may or may not contemplate an 
alternative if not enough suitable land is available within the identified 
concession area. A government seeking to shape boundaries in a way 
that minimizes grievances thus may still end up agreeing to concession 
or production areas that require displacement and raise corresponding 
risks of violating human rights obligations.
Efforts to reshape boundaries may carry greater risks than shaping 
them in the first place, particularly when the land in question is of such 
a significant scope that a formal agreement or renegotiation of the 
contract might be required. Risks related to renegotiation are discussed 
below, while risks arising from asking an investor to undertake volun-
tary action are discussed above. In addition, if the government seeks 
to use this option repeatedly, or at a large scale, this strategy could 
create reputational risks for the government, affecting future investors’ 
perceptions of the operating environment. Yet another risk is that the 
land that aggrieved individuals or communities recover through the 
reshaping of boundaries might be inadequate, or less optimal than the 
land remaining within the concession.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT TRY TO SHAPE  
OR RESHAPE CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?
As noted above, the option to shape boundaries after an agreement 
has been signed will not always be available. This approach could be 
taken, however, when the investor-state contract does not provide 
explicit boundaries of the land to be leased or used, the government 
and investor have not yet agreed to the specific boundaries, and the 
relevant process established by domestic law or by contract provides 
an opportunity for the government to shape boundaries as needed. 
Because of these restrictions, a government may not realize that such 
a strategy would be useful until it is too late to implement. However, 
because the process of surveying the land can itself create tensions with 
existing land users, it is conceivable that situations may arise in which 
this strategy would be viable and useful.
A strategy to reshape boundaries does not have the same time 
constraints, and could be undertaken at any point during the contract 
term. Because this was likely not a process contemplated at the time 
the contract was negotiated, however, there may be more legal and 
political risks tied to this strategy. This strategy thus might be more 
feasible when it is also in the interest of the investor, for the reasons 
outlined above, or when the investor is not tied to the land in question 
and is amenable to receiving replacement land.
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FACILITATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES  
FOR AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
A government can facilitate efforts to resolve disputes or grievances 
in many ways, including through establishing, supporting, or 
facilitating access to dispute resolution processes for affected 
individuals or communities. Such processes include non-judicial 
public institutions, government-supported mediation and facil-
itation, project-level grievance mechanisms established by the 
investor, and external grievance mechanisms. Dispute resolution 
processes should be designed carefully: while they have the potential 
to minimize conflict and foster solutions, they can also compound 
conflicts and grievances when not designed and implemented 
according to best practices.
Ensuring access to appropriate dispute resolution processes can help 
resolve community grievances regarding land-based investments. 
Dispute resolution processes include courts and tribunals, as well as 
“non-judicial” processes and institutions. The latter are not meant to 
replace domestic courts, but a government may find that, in some cases, 
an additional forum is useful to address community concerns, such as 
when domestic court systems are overburdened or inaccessible.
WHAT ARE NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE  
RESOLUTION PROCESSES? 
Non-judicial “dispute resolution processes” are procedures used to help 
resolve a grievance, dispute, or claim. While these come in many forms, 
four types are particularly relevant for land grievances:
 ö Non-judicial institutions that are financed by the state and have 
some scope to receive or investigate complaints, such as Cambodia’s 
Cadastral Commission or the Kenya National Commission  
on Human Rights;
 ö Government-supported mediation and facilitation between  
communities and companies;
 ö Project-level grievance mechanisms, which are generally established 
by the investor, either voluntarily or in compliance with government 
requirements; and
 ö External grievance mechanisms, such as those provided by 
multi-stakeholder initiatives or certification schemes (such as the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil), or by development finance 
institutions (such as the International Finance Corporation’s 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman).
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS,  
AND WHAT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED?
A neutral and easily accessible dispute resolution process can offer 
an effective way to resolve grievances in a timely manner, as well as 
to remedy past wrongs. Resolving grievances quickly and effectively 
can also help limit or mitigate consequences that might otherwise 
arise from grievances, such as public outrage, protest, or even violent 
conflict. In turn, this may reduce operational, financial, and reputa-
tional risks for the government and the investor.
As part of their obligations to protect human rights, governments 
are bound to take steps to provide access to effective remedy for 
business-related human rights abuses.71 This includes state-based 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, which can be complemented 
by project-level grievance mechanisms and other dispute resolu-
tion processes. To ensure compatibility with human rights, dispute 
resolution processes should comply with the effectiveness criteria for 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms set out in the UN Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights. This means that processes should 
be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, and transparent. They 
also should be rights-compatible, meaning that outcomes and remedies 
are aligned with human rights norms, and should evolve and improve 
over time. In addition, operational-level or project-based mechanisms 
operated by or in partnership with the investor should be based on 
engagement with the stakeholders that will use them.72
Each of these criteria highlight a range of issues to consider in 
the design or implementation of any dispute resolution process. For 
example, to ensure accessibility, careful attention should be paid 
regarding language, cost, physical location, and ease of use, including 
for people who are illiterate. Considerations regarding gender must also 
be factored into the design, as women and girls often face additional 
barriers in accessing dispute resolution processes.73
Remedies awarded through such processes must also be appro-
priately tailored and proportionate to the specific concern. As with 
compensation, discussed below, remedies should be determined in 
consultation with affected persons.74
SHOULD A GOVERNMENT CONSIDER ESTABLISHING  
AN INDEPENDENT MECHANISM? 
A government can establish independent mechanisms to address land 
grievances. Alternatively, it can empower existing public institutions 
to assist with the investigation of complaints and the determination of 
an appropriate remedy. Government mechanisms may focus primarily 
on land claims, or on a broader range of issues, such as human rights. 
In some contexts, mechanisms established by the government may be 
perceived as more legitimate than investor-established mechanisms. 
This may not be the case, however, when government representatives 
also act as investors, or when the government has demonstrated its 
intention to allow a problematic investment to continue. In such 
circumstances, concerns about legitimacy can sometimes be alleviated 
by ensuring that the dispute resolution process operates independently, 
and that, when appropriate, it possesses the power to require (rather 
than merely recommend) that investors or the government provide a 
remedy. In addition to establishing or empowering appropriate mech-
anisms, processes, or institutions, it is equally important to facilitate 
their use by aggrieved individuals or communities.
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BOX 12:  INSUFFICIENT REMEDIES:  
EXAMPLE FROM THE MINING INDUSTRY
An example of compensation for human rights abuses that was 
challenged as not being appropriately tailored and proportionate is 
the compensation paid by Barrick Gold Corporation to women who 
had been raped by security guards contracted by the company. The 
women were initially offered assistance with setting up small-scale 
development projects, such as being given secondhand clothes to 
sell or livestock. Such remedies were perceived as incommensurate 
with, and not designed to remedy, the harm they had suffered. The 
company later announced plans to adjust the remedy to a scheme 
that was more reliant on cash payments. This was also seen as 
ineffective, owing in part to the fact that all women receiving 
compensation were to receive a uniform amount, regardless of the 
gravity of the violation they had suffered.75
SHOULD A GOVERNMENT HELP FACILITATE MEDIATION  
BETWEEN THE INVESTOR AND THE COMMUNITY?
Mediation is a dispute resolution process that is facilitated by a 
neutral third party; it is generally non-binding. Not all situations are 
suitable for mediation. When grievances relate to criminal offenses, for 
example, those offenses should be prosecuted rather than mediated. 
In addition, when relevant stakeholders are not committed to reaching 
an agreed outcome, mediation will not work.89 When stakeholders do 
wish to address their conflict through mediation, however, a govern-
ment potentially can assist, including through helping to install an 
independent facilitator with expertise in dispute resolution. Mediators 
and facilitators must refrain from exerting any undue influence over 
community members, and their selection should be agreed upon by 
both the community and the investor. In addition, negotiations related 
to how the mediation will proceed should take place in the context 
of both sides having access to all relevant information regarding the 
investment. When requested, providing the community with access 
to legal representation or assistance during the mediation can help to 
minimize power imbalances between the parties and to build mean-
ingful consensus.90
SHOULD A GOVERNMENT REQUIRE OR ENCOURAGE  
PROJECT-LEVEL GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS,  
OR FACILITATE THE USE OF EXTERNAL MECHANISMS?
Governments should encourage investors to develop their own 
project-level grievance mechanisms to complement existing state-
based dispute resolution processes.91 In some circumstances, 
governments might consider requiring investors to establish them. 
Such mechanisms, which may use conciliation, negotiation, or more 
adjudicatory processes, often can resolve disputes in a more efficient 
manner than court processes while also removing from the govern-
ment the operational burden of hearing complaints. They should not, 
however, preclude individuals from accessing domestic courts or other 
forums for seeking redress.92 One way of ensuring that a project-level 
mechanism operates legitimately is to incorporate the oversight of an 
independent supervisor, or a representative stakeholder group.93 Where 
needed, an independent, neutral expert can be added to the stakeholder 
group to help facilitate the group’s oversight role.94
In addition to project-level mechanisms, other external account-
ability processes through which individuals can pursue complaints 
also exist. A government confronting land grievances can thus explore 
whether these additional processes are available to aggrieved individ-
uals, and, if so, can provide information or other support to facilitate 
their use. These mechanisms include those provided by multi-stake-
holder initiatives and certification schemes, like the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil and the Forest Stewardship Council, as well as 
complaints processes offered by development finance institutions, such 
as the International Finance Corporation (IFC). When the investor is 
a member of, certified by, or has received funding from such entities, 
these external mechanisms will generally be an option for individuals or 
communities harmed by an investment.
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BOX 13: CAMBODIA’S  
CADASTRAL COMMISSION
Cambodia’s Cadastral Commission is a public institution that was 
created to resolve disputes regarding land ownership in a quicker, 
less expensive, and less adversarial manner than resorting to a 
court.76 The Commission has a three-tiered hierarchy (district, 
provincial, and national levels), and is empowered to hear disputes 
about land ownership of untitled land.77 The district level seeks 
to assist parties to arrive at an agreement through facilitation and 
mediation. If agreement cannot be reached, parties can take the 
matter to the provincial Cadastral Commission, which has the 
power to “decide” a dispute.78 Its decision can be appealed to the 
National Cadastral Commission, whose decision is then appealable 
to Cambodia’s court system.79
One significant shortcoming is the limited scope of issues that 
the Commission can consider, which precludes claimants from 
pursuing related claims falling outside its mandate.80 For instance, 
community members that brought a claim to Cambodia’s Koh 
Kong Provincial Court regarding, amongst other complaints, 
infringements on property rights allegedly caused by investments 
in sugar plantations were referred to the Cadastral Commission 
because the claim involved a dispute over unregistered land. In 
the Cadastral Commission process, however, the claimants were 
unable to pursue an additional claim challenging the legality of 
the sugar plantations, because the Commission did not have the 
jurisdiction to determine such a claim.81
BOX 14: THE KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION  
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights is an 
independent institution that can hear complaints regarding a broad 
range of human rights,82 including complaints about land-related 
issues.83 The Commission attempts to resolve complaints using 
conciliation, mediation, and negotiation, but ultimately has the 
power of a court to order the payment of compensation84 or “any 
other lawful remedy or redress.”85 The Commission has experience 
managing a large number of complaints in a rights-compliant way.86
In practice, the Commission’s summonses and its orders for 
redress are not always implemented, and have been ignored by 
government officials.87 However, this problem also plagues the 
country’s courts.88
BOX 15: THE IFC’S COMPLIANCE  
ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN
The IFC’s Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) is a grievance 
mechanism accessible to persons aggrieved by a project financed 
by the IFC. In a recent case, CAO-led mediations resulted in 
a Vietnamese rubber corporation reaching an agreement with 
14 project-affected communities in Cambodia.95 The investor 
committed to not clearing or developing additional land or other-
wise expanding its operations associated with certain concessions. 
This commitment was accompanied by a range of other measures 
aimed at redressing past adverse impacts and minimizing the 
negative impacts of existing operations, including commitments 
to only use chemical products that comply with environmental 
regulations, to repair infrastructure damaged by the investor, and 
to adopt an operational grievance mechanism for the investor’s 
agribusiness operations within Cambodia. The agreement came 
19 months after the lodging of the communities’ initial written 
complaint.96
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF ESTABLISHING, REQUIRING,  
OR FACILITATING ACCESS TO A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS?
In developing or requiring non-judicial dispute resolution processes, 
a government risks doing so in a manner that fails to comply with its 
international legal obligations, and should thus take care in designing 
such processes. For example, a government-implemented grievance 
mechanism should meet the criteria articulated in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, described above, and in 
particular should not supplant or preclude access to judicial or other 
non-judicial mechanisms.
While efforts to establish, require, or facilitate access to a dispute 
resolution process are not likely to implicate an investment treaty 
obligation, some situations might raise risks. For example, if requiring 
an investor to establish a grievance mechanism is contrary to an already 
existing commitment given by the government, this requirement could 
be considered problematic. Or, if a public institution were to impose a 
solution to address land grievances that was contrary to the investor’s 
protected interests, a government might confront tensions in seeking 
to implement that solution while also meeting its obligations under an 
applicable investment treaty. Additionally, to the extent that a govern-
ment’s efforts to facilitate access to existing grievance mechanisms 
are seen as encouraging opposition to the project or frustrating the 
investment’s operations, an investor might also argue that the govern-
ment’s actions violated its obligations under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, full protection and security obligation, or other 
treaty commitment.97
There are also risks that the dispute resolution process will not 
effectively resolve grievances, or will not be used by aggrieved persons. 
For example, a mechanism that excludes legitimate complainants or is 
hard to access may be ineffective. Those aggrieved may decide not to 
pursue a remedy through a dispute resolution process if the remedies 
offered are inadequate, or if engaging with the process precludes 
pursuit of claims in other legal forums.98 Affected individuals also may 
be unwilling to engage with dispute resolution processes for fear of 
government- or company-backed reprisals.99 Project-level grievance 
mechanisms, in particular, run the risk that the relevant investor may 
become unable or unwilling to maintain the requisite level of resources 
and engagement for the mechanism to operate effectively.
RESTITUTING PROPERTY TO DISPLACED  
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
When grievances relate to the loss of land or property, restitution 
to those who lost their land may be one of the most effective 
remedies that a government can employ. However, restitution of 
land already allocated to an investor may not always be possible, 
may not be deemed appropriate, or may raise risks related to a gov-
ernment’s investment law obligations. A government that decides to 
pursue restitution by taking land from an investor and returning it 
to displaced individuals should follow requirements set by domestic 
and international law regarding expropriation of property.
Restitution can be an appropriate remedy in some cases for individuals 
or communities that have lost their land or material possessions due 
to a land-based investment. When applicable, restitution should also 
always be considered once an investment has concluded, including 
when it has failed (see Box 16). Restitution may not be possible, 
however, where the land has been rendered uninhabitable or 
unproductive, and may be difficult for a government in the context of 
ongoing investments, where investors have ownership or leasehold 
rights over the land in question. Such challenges are not insurmount-
able, but pose some risks.
WHAT IS  
RESTITUTION?
Restitution refers to “reestablish[ing] the situation which existed 
before the wrongful act was committed.”100 While restitution can 
include a range of actions, this discussion focuses on restitution as 
the return of land or property. When development-based evictions 
or displacement have occurred, including due to land-based invest-
ments, a government should, when possible, “establish conditions 
and provide the means, including financial, for voluntary return in 
safety and security, and with dignity, to homes or places of habitual 
residence.”101 Such a return should only occur when in line with the 
wishes of the resettled individuals or communities,102 and according to 
procedures that are equitable, timely, independent, transparent, and 
non-discriminatory.103
WHEN IS  
RESTITUTION APPROPRIATE?
Grievances flowing from land-based investments are often related to 
displacement from land. In some cases, the negative impacts of such 
displacement may be so severe, and the grievances so strong, that 
restitution of land may appear to be the most appropriate option. 
Moreover, in certain situations, restitution may be necessary for the 
government to comply with its human rights obligations. Indeed, res-
titution is the most appropriate remedy for property- or land-related 
violations of human rights, to which other remedies like compensa-
tion are secondary alternatives.104 Accordingly, when rights violations 
are involved, a government should assess whether restitution is 
possible before considering alternatives like compensation. Restitu-
tion is particularly important when indigenous peoples’ land has been 
taken without their free, prior, and informed consent.105
Restitution is not always possible, however. In practice, the 
circumstances of forced evictions and resettlement “seldom allow for 
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BOX 16: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER  
AN INVESTMENT HAS CONCLUDED?
What happens after an investment has concluded can sometimes 
be as consequential as what happens during its operation. Although 
many land-based investments fail,106 and still others are designed 
for a limited duration, governments and investors do not always 
have comprehensive plans for sustainable project closure. This 
creates the possibility that land grievances can endure even after 
the investor has left. When these grievances relate to displacement 
from land, and when that land remains habitable or productive, 
restitution of the land to those displaced is an appropriate option, 
and should be considered before assessing whether the land can be 
offered to other investors.107 Where there are multiple claims to the 
land, or when the contested evictions are not recent, a government 
should strive to ensure that efforts to restitute such land benefit 
those with legitimate tenure claims.
restitution and return.”108 For instance, it may be materially impos-
sible to order restitution in respect of property that has been altered 
or damaged to the point that its return would not fulfill the right being 
asserted.109 In this case, restitution will not be able to entirely remedy 
the wrong, and compensation should be used as an additional or alter-
native remedy.110
In addition, restitution may not be deemed appropriate when the 
land was expropriated for the public’s benefit or for a public purpose. 
As discussed in Box 17, it is unclear whether the taking of land to facil-
itate a private investment can constitute a public purpose, especially 
where the potential public benefits of such an investment, such as job 
creation or increased national fiscal revenues, are difficult to realize.
TO WHOM SHOULD RESTITUTED  
PROPERTY BE MADE AVAILABLE?
Restitution should be awarded to the individuals or communities who 
held some form of title or legitimate tenure claims to the property 
before it was taken away. Restitution should be undertaken with 
the participation of affected individuals, groups, or communities in 
the planning and management of return processes.118 This includes 
special measures to ensure the meaningful participation of women to 
overcome existing gender biases and marginalization, if needed.119 An 
inclusive process helps assure that restoring individuals to the situation 
they were in before they were deprived of property does not reinforce 
pre-existing inequalities.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS  
OF RESTITUTION AS A REMEDY?
Restitution of land used by an investor may raise risks related to a 
government’s international investment law obligations. An investor, 
for example, might argue that the government’s decision to grant 
restitution:
 ö Constitutes an expropriation of the investment;
 ö Breaches the investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment by 
violating a legitimate expectation that it would have unrestricted  
and continuing access to the land; or
 ö Impacts more on that investor than on other businesses  
and therefore constitutes discrimination.
A government seeking to take land from an investor and return it to 
displaced individuals or communities should first determine whether 
the investor in fact has valid rights to the land. If so, the government 
should follow requirements set by domestic and international law 
regarding expropriation of property.
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BOX 17: DOES THE TAKING OF LAND  
FOR A PRIVATE INVESTMENT  
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC PURPOSE?
Whether the taking of land to facilitate the purposes of private 
investment constitutes a public purpose is debatable. The Volun-
tary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
exhort states to “clearly define the concept of public purpose in 
law, in order to allow for judicial review” while also ensuring that 
“all actions are consistent with their national law as well as their 
existing obligations under national and international law, and with 
due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional 
and international instruments.”111
Projects requiring land for the construction of public amenities 
and services may well fall within the public interest, as may large 
infrastructure projects requiring land.112 It may be more difficult to 
invoke the public interest where land is taken to enable an investor 
to carry out an agricultural or forestry concession. The benefits 
of agricultural or forestry investments are said to lie primarily in 
their potential for employment creation, leveraged infrastructure, 
and increased public revenue;113 however, such potential is often 
difficult to realize, which may reduce the chances an investment 
will constitute a public purpose.
Courts in different jurisdictions have expressed divergent 
opinions on whether the taking of land for a private investment 
can constitute a public purpose. The Supreme Court of Canada 
noted in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia that a logging 
concession could be considered to be a public interest objective 
that could override Aboriginal title, while also noting that logging 
is a “serious infringement [of Aboriginal title] that will not lightly 
be justified.”114 In that case, the Court ultimately held that logging 
in the area in question was not in the public interest, as it was not 
economically viable, and had an impact on the plaintiff’s Aboriginal 
title that was disproportionate to the economic benefits that would 
accrue to the State, or Canadian society generally.115
However, in the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 
case, discussed above in Box 9, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights rejected an argument that the allocation of indig-
enous land for the purposes of investment constituted a public 
purpose.116 It held that such an argument approached indigenous 
claims to land title “from the standpoint of land productivity and 
agrarian law,” which was “insufficient” because it failed to address 
“the distinctive characteristics of such peoples.”117
BOX 18: GROUP CLAIMS  
REGARDING RESTITUTION OF LAND
When it comes to claims by indigenous groups or tribal commu-
nities requesting restitution of land, the tests used to determine 
whether restitution is warranted vary by jurisdiction. Often, 
a primary issue considered is whether affected claimants can 
demonstrate an enduring connection,120 or an “all-encompassing 
relationship,”121 with the land claimed. In addition, domestic and 
regional laws differ regarding the entitlement of indigenous or 
tribal communities to restitution of land when an investor has 
subsequently obtained an interest in the land in good faith. For 
instance, private ownership of land can act as a complete bar to 
restitution in Australia.122 In Canada, however, the Supreme Court 
has found that once Aboriginal title has been established, a project 
might need to be canceled if its continuation “would be unjustifi-
ably infringing.”123 Meanwhile, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has determined that the transfer of ownership of land into 
the hands of an investor does not pose a bar to restitution,124 noting 
that otherwise restitution rights would become “meaningless.”125
COMPENSATING AFFECTED  
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
Providing compensation (land, goods, services, and/or money) is 
one way in which a government, as well as investors, may seek to 
alleviate land grievances. While compensation is often a significant 
remedial mechanism, it should not be used to excuse flagrant viola-
tions of land rights or human rights. Further, when the grievances 
are severe, compensation alone may not stop the risk of community 
conflict and protest. When provided, compensation should be 
determined in consultation with affected individuals or community 
representatives, and should comprise primarily “in kind” compensa-
tion—land, goods, and improved public services—with supplemental 
cash payments where appropriate. Compensation should seek to 
restore project-affected individuals or communities to a position 
that is as favorable as, or more favorable than, their position before 
the harm causing the grievance occurred.
Compensating individuals or communities that have been or will 
be negatively affected by a land-based investment is another option 
available to a government seeking to address land grievances. While 
compensation is often an insufficient remedy for certain grievances,  
at times it may be the most appropriate option available. When  
compensation is provided, a government should carefully assess  
who should receive compensation, as well as the type and quantum  
of compensation.
WHAT IS  
“COMPENSATION”?
Compensation, in this context, means the payment of money and/or the 
allocation of land or other goods and services as a means of acknowl-
edging and remedying a harm. Such harms can include, for example, 
displacing individuals or communities from the land on which they rely 
or otherwise causing them to suffer financial loss.
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS OF  
COMPENSATION AS A REMEDY?
Compensation, whether monetary or in kind, is unlikely to provide a 
comprehensive remedy for certain grievances, such as those arising 
from forced evictions and accompanying human rights violations. 
One ex-World Bank staffer, for instance, underlined the importance 
of compensation in this context while lamenting that the limits of 
compensation as a remedy “reinforce the main poverty risks inherent in 
forced displacements.”126 Compensation will almost always fall short for 
resettled communities because of the many economic, social, cultural, 
and other networks that are broken when a community is forced off its 
land. The destruction of these networks, which are often unquantifi-
able, can impoverish those resettled in ways that extend beyond simply 
losing a real property asset. For this reason, a government seeking to 
redress grievances stemming from forced evictions and resettlement 
should first assess whether restitution of the taken land is possible.
WHEN IS  
COMPENSATION APPROPRIATE?
A government may determine that compensation should be incorpo-
rated in its efforts to address a range of grievances tied to land-based 
investments. For example, compensation might be offered to amend 
for negative environmental impacts causing harm to communities, or 
for unwarranted detentions of individuals protesting an investment. 
When compensation is provided to address violations of human rights, 
its provision will not necessarily absolve a government of its legal 
obligations, but may form an important part of the remedy for  
such violations.
Compensation is most commonly considered as a strategy for 
addressing displacement (both voluntary and involuntary) from 
land, as well as related grievances. When involuntary displacement 
has occurred, including forced evictions, a government should first 
consider whether restitution of land, discussed above, is a viable option. 
Even when restitution occurs, compensation may also be necessary 
to address other losses suffered by those forcibly resettled. If the 
land cannot be returned to those who have been resettled, however, 
including when the land is no longer suitable for previous livelihood 
uses, compensation is an appropriate remedy for a government  
to consider.
When grievances concern an investment’s future effects, and those 
concerned remain living on their land, compensation should not be 
viewed as a means of “buying” or “paying a penalty for” future human 
rights violations, such as those linked to forced evictions. However, 
providing adequate compensation can be an appropriate remedy when 
the taking of land is deemed to be in the public interest,127 or for a 
public purpose.128 The European Court of Human Rights, for example, 
has deferred to governments to determine when takings are needed 
to fulfill the public interest,129 and has noted that whether the taking 
strikes a fair balance between competing interests depends in part on 
the terms of the compensation offered to those whose land is expropri-
ated.130 Box 17, above, discusses whether taking land for the purposes 
of private investment can constitute a public purpose. In such cases, 
compensation provided as part of a resettlement action plan may be a 
precondition for the legality of the expropriation.
WHO SHOULD  
BE COMPENSATED?
A government seeking to compensate for displacement from land 
must determine who is entitled to compensation. This is a critical 
and complex question in rural areas of low-income countries, where 
different types of land rights can be held by individuals or collec-
tively by households, groups, or communities, and where such rights 
often overlap.131 International standards, such as those developed by 
international and regional development banks,132 underline that absence 
of formal legal title should not bar affected persons from receiving 
compensation for expropriation of their property. A government thus 
needs to compensate all individuals or communities with legitimate 
rights to the land in question, regardless of whether they have formal 
legal documentation.
In some places, women risk not benefiting from compensation 
received by their household for the expropriation of their land.133 This 
is especially true in societies where women are unlikely to hold legal 
title, as compensation is often paid only to individuals who hold legal 
title to the land or who are deemed the “head” of the household.134 For 
instance, amongst households resettled in Vietnam to make way for 
hydropower projects, some women only learned that compensation 
had been paid to the household after it had already been spent.135  To 
address these challenges, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
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United Nations recommends that a government paying compensa-
tion identify which household members hold de facto interests in the 
land, and ensure that compensation is paid using a mechanism that 
facilitates joint decision-making within households regarding the use 
of such funds.136
Individuals who lose access to common land or public lands 
on which they had relied for resources or livelihood activities are 
particularly vulnerable, as they are often overlooked in compensation 
schemes.137 Such “landless” individuals must also receive compensation 
for their economic displacement from the land.138
SHOULD COMPENSATION  
BE IN KIND OR FINANCIAL?
When displacement from land has occurred, in-kind compensation—in 
the form of replacement property, public services, and infrastruc-
ture—should be the primary form of compensation allocated.139 This is 
preferable to cash compensation, which transfers the risks associated 
with acquiring replacement land, housing, and infrastructure onto the 
individuals or communities being resettled.140 In many contexts,  
cash compensation alone will not suffice in restoring the lost liveli-
hoods of recipients, leading to further impoverishment. Any replace-
ment land should also be titled and registered in the names of both 
female and male heads of each household when relevant. Additional 
arrangements that can be included in a “compensation package” to 
communities include state-funded pensions,141 increased access to 
health care,142 and increased spending by the investor on community 
development programs.143
HOW TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION:  
(I) CONSULTATION
A government should consult with the affected individuals or 
community when determining the form and amount of compensa-
tion.144 Consultation has many advantages. Incorporating a commu-
nity’s perspective can help in restoring any economic, social, or other 
networks harmed by displacement; it may also help to avoid future 
community grievances, conflict, or litigation. Consultation may also 
minimize the chances of a court later determining that the type or 
amount of compensation was insufficient or unreasonable.
Consultation processes should ensure opportunities for women 
and other non-dominant groups within a community to provide input. 
Gender-sensitive consultative strategies include researching the times 
and locations that suit women’s availability, anonymous voting on 
proposals to facilitate participation free of influence, and expressly 
requiring women to be included in meetings of community leaders.145
HOW TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION:  
(II) CALCULATION OF QUANTUM
Where land cannot be returned, individuals who have lost land should 
be compensated with land commensurate in quality, size, and value, 
or better.146 Such land should be accompanied by security of tenure, 
as well as adequate housing and access to necessary services.147 In 
addition, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based 
Evictions and Displacement recommend that, at a minimum, a 
government must provide displaced individuals with “safe and secure 
access to:
 ö essential food, potable water and sanitation;
 ö basic shelter and housing;
 ö appropriate clothing;
 ö essential medical services;
 ö livelihood sources;
 ö fodder for livestock and access to common property resources  
previously depended upon; and
 ö education for children and childcare facilities.”148
A government providing cash compensation should ensure the amount 
(quantum) is appropriate. Leading practices seek to place the affected 
individuals in a position that is as favorable as, or better than, the 
position they were in before the land was taken.149 In addition to 
incorporating objective valuations of the market value of the land, 
improvements, and any lost personal property, this may require 
economic analyses of land-derived income, and articulation of the 
cultural, economic, and other benefits provided by the land.150 This can 
be extremely difficult, and many domestic laws regarding compensation 
for resettlement fall short of this standard, compensating only for the 
market value of lost assets.151
As noted above, the loss of land is not the only loss from land-based 
investments that must be compensated. Compensation must also be 
paid for any other economically assessable damage, which, as noted by 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions 
and Displacement, may include “loss of life or limb; physical or mental 
harm; lost opportunities, including employment, education and social 
benefits; material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of 
earning potential; moral damage; and costs required for legal or expert 
assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social 
services.”152 Calculation of fair compensation for these losses should 
include a gender-specific analysis.153
WHO  
PAYS?
When compensation is provided to address displacement caused by 
land-based investments, the government is generally responsible for 
providing it. Under international law, the government is the primary 
bearer of human rights obligations, while many domestic laws also 
place the responsibility to compensate on the government.154 In 
practice, however, governments may shift the burden of compensation 
onto investors, for instance, as part of the costs of land leases.155 When 
relevant finance-related standards, such as the IFC Performance 
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability or the Equator 
Principles, apply to an investment, investors may also have to supple-
ment domestically mandated compensation amounts to ensure that 
those international standards are met.156
THE NEED FOR GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS,  
MONITORING, AND EVALUATION
Compensation must be monitored and evaluated to track its impact,157 
as well as to ensure it is granted in its entirety in a timely manner.158 
This can be done by independent state institutions, such as human 
rights commissions or land boards. Government decisions regarding 
compensation should also be subject to judicial review, ensuring 
that decisions are reasonable and accountable.159 For communities 
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lacking easy access to judicial institutions, other government- or 
investor-operated grievance mechanisms whose procedures are tailored 
to community contexts may also be needed.164 Such procedures are 
especially important where the entity (the government or the investor) 
determining the amount of compensation is also the entity paying 
that compensation, as it otherwise may be incentivized to reduce the 
amount of compensation payable.165
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS  
OF PROVIDING COMPENSATION?
The potential consequences of providing compensation vary depending 
on the point at which the grievance arises, as well as the type of 
grievance to be compensated. The below discusses relevant considera-
tions when the grievance relates to displacement from land.
Where restitution or return of the land is not possible, compensation can 
act as an appropriate, albeit likely insufficient, remedy. One significant 
risk, however, is that property or resources lost through displacement 
may be undervalued, resulting in inadequate compensation for those 
displaced. From a legal perspective, compensation that is adequate and 
rights-compliant might limit the government’s liability in domestic 
courts, regional human rights courts, and other international human 
rights institutions. So long as the government provides the compen-
sation, or the investor has agreed to do so under the investor-state 
contract, provision of compensation would also be unlikely to engender 
government liability under any operative investment treaty or inves-
tor-state contract.
Where a community remains on the land and the grievance concerns 
future impacts of an investment, compensation will be less appro-
priate, unless the community has provided its free, prior, and informed 
consent to vacating the land in exchange for agreed compensation. 
Without such an agreement, a government seeking to “resettle and 
compensate” may violate its legal obligations under international 
human rights law. This could result in official findings of legal liability 
for violations of international human rights law, which could potentially 
be accompanied by orders from a human rights tribunal to restitute 
taken lands, as occurred in the Sawhoyamaxa case at the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, discussed in Box 9.
As a practical matter, a “resettle and compensate” approach can also 
inflame community discontent, leading to demonstrations or conflict. 
In such circumstances, the risk of property damage and the disruption 
of investment projects increases, as does the risk that protestors 
might be harmed by security personnel meant to protect the invest-
ment. In addition, because compensation is generally incapable of 
fully replenishing what a community loses when it is transplanted, a 
displaced community is likely to become impoverished.166 Increased 
poverty can lead to lower socioeconomic indicators and greater demand 
for public services and development programs,167 requiring significant 
financial resources to address. Moreover, improper resettlements pose 
reputational risks for governments, as resulting conflicts can create the 
impression of an unstable business environment.
RENEGOTIATING WITH  
THE INVESTOR
Grievances arising from existing land-based investments may, 
in certain cases, arise from the legal terms of the investor-state 
contract and the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under 
that contract. In such cases, renegotiation of the investor-state 
contract to alter those rights or obligations may help address the 
grievances. There are, however, a number of challenges that can 
arise with respect to renegotiations. For one, investors may be 
unwilling to give up rights previously secured or to take on new 
obligations under the contract; thus, it may be difficult to bring them 
back to the negotiating table and secure additional commitments. In 
such cases, the government may be limited in what it can accom-
plish, particularly if it is concerned about potential liability under 
investment treaties. Moreover, the government party to the contract 
may not have an interest in addressing the relevant issue(s), or the 
authority to do so.
In long-term contracts, requests for renegotiation are not uncommon. 
Indeed, they are often requested by investors who are party to inves-
tor-state contracts and seek to reduce their obligations or increase  
their rights under the agreement. Government requests for renegotia-
tion in order to address land grievances are therefore also possible, and 
may be a feasible option to ensure that the contract survives over time.
However, when one party seeks to renegotiate a contract, the other 
party may resist, reluctant to give up what it sees as validly secured 
legal rights. Thus, a government seeking to renegotiate an inves-
tor-state contract for a land-based investment may face difficulties 
getting the investor to return to the table. In some cases, the contract 
will specify circumstances in which renegotiation is mandatory;  
absent such language, renegotiation requests may not be met with the 
desired response.
WHEN MIGHT AN INVESTOR  
BE WILLING TO RENEGOTIATE?
Certain factors may render an investor more likely to renegotiate. 
Efforts to understand the investor’s strategy and culture can be helpful 
for assessing whether it might agree to a renegotiation request.168 An 
investor with other interests in the country may be more willing to 
renegotiate and less likely to seek arbitration, as it has some incentive 
to maintain its relationship with the government. Likewise, if an 
investor is more interested in the products it would receive through 
the investment—for example, rubber needed for the core operations 
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BOX 19: COMPENSATION RELATED TO SUGAR 
CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA
In Cambodia, villagers alleging that they were forcibly evicted to 
make way for sugar plantations have pursued multiple avenues for 
receiving remedies, including compensation. One avenue pursued 
by community members was to seek compensation from an Ad 
Hoc Inter-Ministerial Committee, convened by the Cambodian 
government in 2014 to resolve human rights issues arising from 
land concessions that were transferred to sugar plantation compa-
nies, including Koh Kong Sugar Industry Co. Ltd. and Phnom Penh 
Sugar Co.160 The committee involves Cambodian government 
departments and representatives from the European Union, and is 
tasked with working with sugar companies to devise a mechanism 
for determining and paying affected villagers due compensation.161
Separately, some villagers displaced by sugar plantations brought 
a court case in the United Kingdom against Tate & Lyle, which had 
purchased sugar grown on the disputed land. The villagers claim 
that they own the land, and thus also the crops grown on it, and 
argue that they are owed compensation for the purchased sugar.162 
They also allege that these events amount to violations of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.163
of a parent company—than in monetary compensation, it may be more 
willing to renegotiate.
An investor also might be more amenable to renegotiation if 
there has been public pressure around the investment, and credible 
documentation of issues related to it. Conversely, an investor with 
significant home country support may be less interested in renego-
tiating, relying instead on such support to pressure the host govern-
ment to revoke its request. In addition, an investor that has access to 
investor-state arbitration under an investment treaty might have less 
incentive to renegotiate.
WHAT POTENTIAL RISKS  
ARISE FROM THIS OPTION?
If a government seeks to renegotiate the investor-state contract, and 
the investor does not wish to cooperate, a government might try to 
exercise political pressure and take or threaten sovereign action (such 
as a change in the law to accomplish what the renegotiation had aimed 
to achieve). Investment arbitration tribunals have disfavored those 
approaches, and have held governments liable under international 
investment treaties for using government powers to compel investors 
to give up their contractual rights.169 Thus, to the extent possible, a 
government seeking to renegotiate should try to do so using only the 
weight that a normal contracting party would use.
TERMINATING AN  
INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT
Another option for addressing land grievances related to the grant 
or performance of an investor-state contract is termination of the 
contract. The terms of the contract and domestic law (including, 
in some legal systems, law developed by judicial doctrine) will 
typically specify the grounds on which one or both parties may or 
must terminate the contract and the remedies, if any, for taking such 
action. One important consideration for a government considering 
contract termination—even termination permitted under domestic 
law and/or the contract—is whether international investment 
treaties affect its exposure to claims and liabilities. Even if a govern-
ment has concluded that it has valid rights to terminate the contract, 
the investor may nevertheless seek to challenge that conclusion. 
In addition, a government may occasionally decide that contract 
termination is in its best interests even when not permitted; in 
such a case, it may seek to terminate the agreement and then pay 
compensation and/or face legal actions.
Contracts, and the rules of domestic law that govern them, typically 
delineate circumstances in which termination by one or both parties  
is permitted, sometimes accompanied by payment of compensation.  
In some circumstances, a government thus may be entitled, and  
may view it to be in its best interests, to put an end to contractual 
relations with an investor. Additionally, a contract may be terminated 
by judicial decision or other government act declaring the contract  
void or unenforceable.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF  
CONTRACT TERMINATION?
There are various legitimate grounds on which a government party to 
an investor-state contract may seek to terminate the deal, including a 
desire to exit a controversial arrangement tainted by fraud or corrup-
tion, or to put an end to an unproductive relationship in which the other 
contracting party fails to fulfill its obligations. Additionally, even if not 
entitled to terminate the contract, a contracting party may nevertheless 
determine that maintaining the deal is not in its best interests and seek 
to exit the deal, paying compensation as required by applicable law.170
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS  
RELATED TO CONTRACT TERMINATION?
Termination of an investor-state contract has potentially negative conse-
quences at both the domestic and international law levels. In addition to 
opposition from the investor, domestic consequences include opposition 
from government officials and entities in support of the project, project 
employees, individuals and entities that generate revenue based on 
supplying goods or services to the investor, and individuals and entities 
that depend on inputs produced by the investor. As a result of such op-
position, the government entity responsible for terminating the contract 
may face legal action, pressure from within the government, or pressure 
from the public.
If the investor is a foreign investor, the investor’s home government 
may use diplomatic channels to question or seek reversal of the decision 
to terminate. If there is an international investment treaty in place that 
covers the investor, the investor may also seek to bring an investor-state 
arbitration claim to challenge the termination.171 When determining 
whether and to what extent a government may be exposed to claims  
and liability under international investment treaties, two key consid-
erations are: (1) whether the contract was terminated using powers 
and authority available to a normal contracting party (as opposed to a 
government entity); and (2) whether the applicable treaty contains an 
“umbrella clause.”
With respect to the first consideration, tribunals have typically deter-
mined that a government’s breach of an investor-state contract will not 
constitute a breach of international law if the government was acting as 
any normal contracting party. If, however, the government terminated 
the contract through an exercise of sovereign powers (by, for example, 
passing a decree or law, or issuing a judicial decision, declaring the 
contract void), then that exercise of sovereign powers could potentially 
give rise to an international law violation under the FET obligation or 
obligation to provide adequate compensation for an expropriation.
The second consideration—whether the treaty has an umbrella 
clause—operates as an exception to the first. While there are some 
differences in opinion among arbitrators on this issue, the majority view 
is that the umbrella clause allows covered foreign investors to bring 
claims against host governments for contract violations (including 
unlawful termination) even when the government has not exercised any 
sovereign powers.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT  
CONSIDER TAKING THIS OPTION?
In some cases, grievances may be so severe, as well as difficult to remedy 
while the investment continues, that cancellation of the investor-state 
contract appears to be the best option. For the government entity 
that is party to the contract, determining whether and when it should 
take this option depends on an analysis of what is justified under the 
circumstances, as well as what is permitted under the contract and the 
law governing its interpretation. While applicable legal frameworks do 
recognize situations in which a party may terminate an investor-state 
contract, those grounds are often specifically defined and, even if 
satisfied, may nevertheless require some form of remedy to be provided.
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In addition to terminating an agreement in accordance with its terms, 
a government may also exercise its sovereign authority to terminate 
an investor-state contract. A court, for example, may rule that a 
contract is void under domestic law. Although the formal purpose 
of such a holding may not be to address land grievances per se, the 
case itself may have arisen from grievances related to the investment. 
Courts play an important role in ensuring that investor-state contracts 
are consistent with legal norms and policies, and this may require 
decisions invalidating deals that violate domestic law. Such decisions, 
however, are not immune from arbitration claims.
REVOKING AUTHORIZATIONS NECESSARY  
FOR INVESTOR OPERATIONS
In certain cases, the reasons behind land grievances (for example, 
the extent of environmental pollution) or the severity of their 
effects (such as resulting violence) may cause a government to 
revoke or terminate existing permits or other authorizations. 
Ideally, the grounds and procedures for terminating existing 
authorizations will be clearly set forth in domestic law, and may 
provide permit holders certain rights of notice and appeal before 
such action is taken. If government officials seek to comply with 
the substantive and procedural requirements of the law when 
terminating such authorizations, those actions are more difficult to 
challenge under both domestic law and international investment 
treaties.
Domestic law generally governs how investment-related authoriza-
tions (for example, environmental permits or investment licenses) 
are provided and how they may be revoked or terminated, including 
permissible grounds, procedures, and available remedies. These rules 
differ between jurisdictions, and often vary depending on the nature 
of the authorization and the activity that it governs. Depending on the 
relevant rules in the host state, the government may have the ability—
and, in some cases, may be required—to revoke or terminate172 
authorizations that are necessary for investment operations.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS  
OF REVOKING AUTHORIZATIONS?
Revoking authorizations, such as permits or licenses, may have a 
number of advantages for a government and for communities. This 
step may help (and in some cases may be necessary to) address the 
relevant grievance. Additionally, to the extent that the revocation 
is done in accordance with applicable substantive and procedural 
requirements, it helps to affirm the rule of law in the host country and 
the government’s commitment to hold investors to their legal obli-
gations. If the authorization was revoked because it had been issued 
through fraud or corruption, or if the revocation was due to harms 
caused by the investor, a subsequent reissuance to another investor 
may produce a more positive outcome.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES  
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OPTION?
Revoking existing permits or other authorizations may pose various 
legal, economic, and political challenges at the domestic and interna-
tional levels.
As with contract termination, a government decision to revoke an 
authorization may prompt negative political and legal reactions at 
the domestic level by those who would be negatively affected by the 
revocation. For example, the entity whose permit, license, or other 
authorization was revoked may contest the action through legal and/
or political avenues. Other stakeholders, such as individuals or entities 
that rely on the operation of the investment project for employment, 
sales revenue, or supply of inputs, may protest any decision that stops 
or halts operations. Government entities that expect or depend on the 
permitted activity for tax or other revenue may similarly  
oppose revocation.
At the international level, a government may face diplomatic 
pressure, as well as investor-state arbitration claims challenging the 
permit revocation. The investor could, for example, potentially argue 
that the revocation violated various obligations or prohibitions under 
the treaty. While the fact that a revocation decision was taken in 
good faith and in accordance with domestic law will help strengthen 
a government’s defense in response to any such arbitration claims, 
neither good faith nor compliance with domestic law will necessarily 
immunize permit revocations from successful challenges under interna-
tional investment treaties.
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BOX 20: WHAT ARGUMENTS MIGHT AN INVESTOR  
MAKE IF A PERMIT IS REVOKED?
An investor bringing a treaty-based arbitration case because of 
a revoked permit might argue that the government violated the 
following:
 ö Non-discrimination obligations: for example, if the activities of 
other domestic or foreign permit-holders also gave rise to griev-
ances or were not conducted in strict compliance with the law, 
but those permit-holders were nevertheless allowed to continue 
operating, the investor whose permit was revoked might argue 
that the revocation decision violated the investment treaty’s 
national treatment or most-favored nation obligations;
 ö Fair and equitable treatment obligation: for example, if the 
permit was terminated without due process, the investor might 
argue that this breached the FET obligation. Or if the investor’s 
obligations under the permit had been interpreted and applied 
in a particular way and then, due to a change in administra-
tive policy or judicial doctrine, were subsequently interpreted 
to impose more stringent requirements on the investor, the 
investor might argue that the shift violated its “legitimate 
expectations”;
 ö Prohibition on uncompensated expropriations: for example, the 
investor may argue that revocation of the permit destroyed the 
value of its investment in the country, constituting an indirect 
expropriation; and
 ö Umbrella clause: for example, the investor may argue that the 
decision to revoke the permit violated the government’s obliga-
tions to the investor under the umbrella clause, thereby asking 
the tribunal to rule on the scope of the government’s and inves-
tor’s respective rights and obligations with respect  
to termination.
WHEN IS REVOKING AN AUTHORIZATION  
AN APPROPRIATE OPTION?
The clearest circumstances in which revocation of authorizations will 
be an appropriate option are when:
 ö Revocation is dictated by domestic law;
 ö Revocation is required in order to fulfill the government’s obligations 
under international human rights law; or
 ö Revocation is necessary to address the grievances (or the circum-
stances giving rise to them), and allowed under the domestic  
legal framework.
A government may, in comparison, face more difficult decisions when 
its obligations under international human rights law are unclear, or 
when there is uncertainty under domestic law regarding the grounds, 
procedures, or remedies for terminating permits or other authoriza-
tions. Moreover, even when the appropriate course of action under 
domestic law or international human rights law is relatively discernible, 
it will be difficult to know in advance whether that action will trigger 
an investment treaty claim and liability. An investment arbitration 
tribunal may, for example, accept that the government’s revocation of 
the authorization was necessary in order to comply with human rights 
obligations while nevertheless deciding that the government is still 
required to pay the investor compensation under the treaty.
GENERAL OPTIONS
When governments become aware of potential land grievances that 
may arise in the future, they may be interested in exploring ways to 
improve their overarching approach to addressing such grievances or 
to minimize their general liability under investment treaties. Taking 
proactive and general steps can be advantageous: they can help prevent 
multiple conflicts from emerging, and, in the event that an investor 
dispute arises in the future, a broad approach to addressing problems 
may be viewed more favorably by an investment arbitration tribunal 
than actions that appear targeted at a specific investor or project. Many 
of the general steps described below, however, are not easily tailored 
to specific situations, nor are they able to provide timely redress to 
individuals or communities that have already suffered harm. In spite 
of these limitations, a host government concerned about protecting its 
citizens from the negative impacts of land-based investments may wish 
to consider the steps below either before or after problems arise.
DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY  
FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM
Land grievances will often center on issues that require comprehen-
sive solutions, such as through law or policy reform. A government 
may undertake a national policy strategy process to determine 
how laws and policies can better protect against the negative 
impacts of investors or other business operations. National Action 
Plans on business and human rights (“NAPs”) are one example of 
a strategic process that can be used to determine how to protect 
against the negative impacts of investments.
Land grievances will often center on issues that are not limited to a 
specific investment or community, such as the need to recognize and 
protect undocumented community land rights across the nation, or the 
desire to better balance the protections provided to investors and to 
citizens. In such circumstances, a government may decide to investigate 
whether legal or policy reform is needed to adequately respond to 
issues underlying land grievances, resulting in the development of a 
national policy strategy. One process that a government can pursue is 
to develop a national action plan on business and human rights, which 
will help the government to determine what reforms are needed. Using 
the example of NAPs, this discussion sets out how a government can 
embark on a policy strategy process to devise comprehensive solutions 
that enhance compliance with international human rights law while still 
complying with obligations under international investment law.
WHAT LEGAL OR PRACTICAL FORCE DO NATIONAL  
POLICY STRATEGIES HAVE?
National policy strategies usually do not have any legal force, but are 
intended to guide the government’s strategy regarding legal and policy 
reform. Thus, while they will not change how investments are regulated 
or establish new ways to redress grievances, policy strategies may 
lead to laws and policies that do attain these objectives. In addition to 
catalyzing legal reform, policy strategies may improve coordination 
amongst different government departments, which can enhance the 
government’s ability to regulate investments.
A national policy strategy process that helps to shape a government’s 
efforts to protect human rights and influences its approach to legal or 
policy reform may also affect an investor’s “legitimate expectations” 
regarding how its investment might be affected by human rights issues. 
This process thus might provide useful context for an investment 
arbitration tribunal if an investor brought a dispute tied to the impacts 
of such reform.
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BOX 21: WHAT IS A NAP?
A National Action Plan on business and human rights is a national 
policy strategy developed by a government that sets out how it will 
protect against adverse human rights impacts caused by business 
enterprises.173 A NAP is not a law, but rather a process by which 
the government determines the laws or policies needed to ensure 
that it is comprehensively preventing, mitigating, and remedying 
adverse impacts of business on human rights.174 It can support legal 
reform in a way that increases inter-governmental coordination 
and policy coherence, and can provide a platform for ongoing 
dialogue with relevant stakeholders.
Each NAP should be adapted to the specific circumstances of 
the country,175 and ideally should be an ongoing process subject 
to review, evaluation, and improvement, rather than a one-off 
document.176 One aspect that can be included in a NAP is a national 
baseline assessment (“NBA”), which is a means of taking stock 
of existing laws and policies that currently address the human 
rights impacts of business operations.177 As part of the NBA, a 
government can carry out a comprehensive survey of existing 
grievances by collecting data from multiple sources; this data can 
be supplemented by additional baseline research.178 Analysis of the 
research, including of the prevalence and gravity of various types of 
grievances and rights violations, can help in determining how law 
or policy reform could reduce the occurrence of negative human 
rights impacts that lead to land grievances.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF DEVELOPING  
A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM?
A government undertaking broad legal reforms, including reforms tied 
to policy strategy processes such as a NAP, may confront some risks 
related to its international investment law obligations. As explained 
below in the discussion on adopting changes to the law, a negatively 
affected investor may seek to argue that the changes to the law breach 
various governmental obligations under an investment treaty.
However, the process of undertaking a national policy strategy does 
not, in itself, raise these risks. As noted above, such a process may 
actually be useful in providing some defense for a government’s actions 
if a dispute was brought, providing a way for the government to show 
that its reforms were reasonable, legitimate, and considered.
ADOPTING CHANGES  
IN THE LAW
Grievances regarding land-based investments may arise because 
there is a gap in the domestic legal framework (or a failure to 
enforce it) that leaves the rights of affected individuals and commu-
nities inadequately protected. In other cases, applicable domestic 
laws may create or exacerbate the grievances. In both of these 
situations, changes to the legal framework may be appropriate or 
necessary. Depending on the issue involved, these changes may be to 
the constitution, to laws, or to regulations or administrative policies 
or acts implementing those laws. The changes may be undertaken 
by the legislative, executive, judicial, or other government branch. 
In addition to opposition from certain stakeholders and associated 
political hurdles, some of these changes may face legal challenges 
regarding their consistency with other domestic and international 
legal norms. Contractual stabilization clauses and international 
investment treaties are two potential sources of conflict.
The establishment of a robust legal framework capable of equitably 
governing rights over and use of land is an ongoing process. This 
process involves various constituents and institutions that refine, 
amend, modify, and even repeal standards and rules over time. While 
there some limits on that flexibility, largely arising from constitutional 
and international restraints on the freedom and powers of domestic 
governments, significant latitude remains for governments to adopt 
and change their laws, including to address grievances arising from 
land-based investments.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT  
CONSIDER TAKING THIS OPTION?
The need to adopt certain changes in the law may be clear based on 
the grievances that have arisen from land-based investments, and the 
reasons for such grievances. This may be particularly apparent when 
a law causes or augments the grievances. Alternatively, a government 
may decide to undertake a more in-depth process to assess necessary 
legal or policy reforms, for example through the development of a NAP, 
as discussed above. Consideration of the need for legal reform may 
also arise in response to an opinion from a human rights tribunal on 
the incompatibility of a country’s domestic laws with its human rights 
commitments, or following the establishment of new international 
instruments, standards, or best practices concerning investments.
Changes in the legal framework can be a key and, indeed, necessary 
option for a government seeking to holistically and effectively address 
serious problems regarding existing land-based investments. Despite 
potential conflicts with stabilization clauses and international invest-
ment treaties, this option will therefore likely form a fundamental part 
of a government’s strategy to address grievances, as well as its efforts to 
prevent future grievances from arising.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS  
OF ADOPTING THIS OPTION?
Changes to domestic legal frameworks may prompt political opposi-
tion, for example, from those who may be negatively affected by the 
changes. Such changes may also lead to domestic legal challenges, such 
as arguments that they violate constitutional protections, or did not 
comply with appropriate procedures.
A government also confronts the risk that changes to the law may be 
challenged by an investor as violating a stabilization provision in the 
investor-state contract. Where stabilization clauses are enforceable, 
an investor benefiting from such a clause may either be freed from, or 
be entitled to compensation for the costs of, having to comply with 
the changes in the law. Moreover, even if a domestic court might deem 
the stabilization clause invalid, an investment arbitration tribunal 
interpreting a contract with such a clause may adopt a different view, 
enforcing it under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treat-
ment obligation.
Even in the absence of a stabilization clause, an investor that is 
negatively affected by changes to the law might initiate an investment 
arbitration claim under an applicable treaty. In doing so, it might argue 
that such changes breach its right to fair and equitable treatment by 
violating a legitimate expectation that relevant laws and policies would 
not change, constitute discrimination by affecting the investor more 
than other businesses, or amount to an expropriation of the investment.
REQUESTING AN ADVISORY OPINION  
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OR BODY
Seeking an advisory opinion from a human rights tribunal can 
provide greater clarity on how a government can manage a potential 
conflict between its human rights duties and its obligations under 
international investment law. While an advisory opinion will not 
be binding on an investment arbitration tribunal, its existence may 
help to dissuade an investor from resorting to arbitration for loss 
suffered as a result of a government’s actions taken to comply with 
the opinion. The options for a government without access to regional 
human rights courts that produce advisory opinions are more limited, 
but include using the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) process to request recommendations from the interna-
tional community.
Two regional human rights courts—the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, which covers the countries of the Americas, and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which covers countries that are 
members of the African Union—provide advisory opinions that clarify 
a state’s human rights obligations in the absence of a formal dispute. A 
government under the jurisdiction of either court could thus seek an 
advisory opinion on complying with its human rights obligations in the 
context of other legal obligations, such as those contained in interna-
tional investment treaties. Such guidance would generally focus on 
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overarching issues, rather than on specific investments or grievances.
A government that does not have access to either court can engage 
with other human rights processes, although these options will usually 
not offer guidance regarding specific instances of conflicting state 
obligations. A government can also facilitate domestic litigation by not 
opposing human rights claims brought against it (see Box 22), which 
may lead to further clarity on how to meet its relevant obligations.
WHAT IS AN  
ADVISORY OPINION?
Advisory opinions help interpret laws within the scope of an adju-
dicatory body’s purview. Regional human rights courts use advisory 
opinions to interpret human rights law. Advisory opinions are inter-
pretations of specific legal questions. They do not require an existing 
dispute, and can consider hypothetical questions. Regional human 
rights courts that provide advisory opinions do so upon request from 
a government or from other institutions, such as a regional human 
rights commission.
Not all adjudicatory bodies provide advisory opinions; investment 
arbitration tribunals do not offer them.179 The European Court of 
Human Rights provides limited advisory opinions, but not on the 
content or scope of the human rights and freedoms set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.180 While the International 
Court of Justice provides advisory opinions, a state cannot  
request one.181
WHAT LEGAL FORCE DO  
ADVISORY OPINIONS HAVE?
Advisory opinions are not binding.182 They are persuasive, however, as 
they are a formal expression of the court’s view on a particular legal 
matter. Advisory opinions can therefore have significant influence 
on the behavior of states—even states that have not submitted to 
the court’s jurisdiction.183 This persuasive character makes advisory 
opinions important sources for clarifying international legal rights and 
corresponding governmental obligations.
WHAT PRACTICAL FORCE COULD  
AN ADVISORY OPINION HAVE?
When a government believes that, by granting a concession, it has 
created a situation in which its human rights obligations may conflict 
with its international investment law obligations, seeking an advisory 
opinion could provide greater clarity on how the government should 
proceed. A government acting to protect human rights in accord-
ance with an advisory opinion will not automatically avoid liability 
under international investment law. However, the existence of an 
advisory opinion may give pause to investors contemplating a claim 
to an investment arbitration tribunal, particularly if the government 
publicly acknowledges the advisory opinion and transparently sets 
out to comply with it. For instance, arguments that a government has 
discriminated against an investor or otherwise acted unreasonably are 
weakened when its actions are clearly intended to comply with the 
opinion of an authoritative adjudicatory body. An advisory opinion 
thus may create doubts as to an investor’s chances of success, lower 
its expectations regarding the amount of compensation it might 
receive if successful, or raise its reputational risks if it were  
to proceed.
WHAT QUESTIONS CAN BE THE SUBJECT  
OF AN ADVISORY OPINION?
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
A member state of the Organization of American States184 can seek an 
advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 
questions regarding the compatibility of its own domestic laws with 
the American Convention on Human Rights or with other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.185 
A government seeking guidance on how to respond to land grievances 
could thus ask the Court whether implementing a proposed law to 
comply with an investment treaty or investor-state contract is compat-
ible with its human rights obligations.
The Court can exercise its discretion not to offer an advisory opinion, 
even where the request put to it is admissible.186 When it has provided 
such opinions in the past, it has issued them between one and three 
years after receipt of the initial request.187
In addition to seeking an advisory opinion from the Inter-American 
Court, a state can also request “advisory services” from the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights.188 Such advice is often initially 
communicated privately to the state, but can be made public.189
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, member 
states of the African Union can seek an advisory opinion from the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights “on any legal matter 
relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, 
provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a 
matter being examined by the [African] Commission [on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights].”190 This is likely broader than the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction, in that “any legal matter” 
likely could include conflicts between the Charter, on one hand, and 
international investment treaties, investor-state contracts, government 
policies, or executive action relating to an investment, on the other. 
While not explicitly mentioned, domestic laws that have an impact on 
human rights concerns likely also come within “any legal matter.”191
The Court’s advisory jurisdiction is relatively untested, and it is 
therefore difficult to predict the likelihood of its granting a request for 
an advisory opinion. There is also no clear indication of how long the 
Court might take to issue an opinion. The Court has so far released only 
one advisory opinion,192 which was issued approximately one year after 
the request was first received.
Members of the African Union technically may be able to request an 
advisory opinion from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as well, although this has not yet been attempted.193
WHAT OPTIONS EXIST FOR COUNTRIES  
WITHOUT REGIONAL COURTS?
Countries that do not fall under the jurisdiction of regional courts 
that offer advisory opinions have fewer opportunities to obtain official 
interpretations of their human rights obligations, and how they square 
with their international investment obligations.
One potential option for member states of the United Nations 
is to seek support or advice from other member states using the 
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. 
Each member state periodically undergoes a UPR, through which the 
members of the Council evaluate the government’s human rights 
performance and offer recommendations. During the UPR, the govern-
ment will submit a national report,194 which can include a request for 
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assistance.195 While the requests are usually for financial assistance or 
technical expertise in establishing human rights institutions,196 member 
states have occasionally requested advice on resolving human rights 
problems.197 Any recommendations received in response would not 
be legally binding, and likely would not be accompanied by extensive 
analysis. Yet such recommendations could strengthen the perceived 
legitimacy of government efforts to protect human rights in such 
contexts and potentially provide new ideas for ways to address  
land grievances.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF SEEKING  
AN ADVISORY OPINION OR OTHER RECOMMENDATION?
While advisory opinions, or other formal recommendations, can provide 
public and compelling clarifications of how a government should uphold 
its human rights obligations in the context of overlapping obligations 
under international investment law, they are not the final resolution of 
specific conflicts. There is also no certainty that a request for an advisory 
opinion will be granted.
One risk is that the existence of an advisory opinion may not  
dissuade an investor from initiating an investor-state arbitration. 
This may be especially true for investors that are not concerned with 
their international reputation. This risk is compounded by the fact 
that advisory opinions generally take years, rather than months, to be 
produced. Another risk is that, if an investor does proceed with a claim, 
the investment arbitration tribunal may not place much weight on the 
advisory opinion. While tribunals may consider the rulings of a regional 




Establishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice” 
on the meaning of international investment treaties can be 
a feasible way for host governments to rein in overly broad and 
unintended interpretations of those treaties. After signing and 
ratifying such treaties, governments retain powers to help shape their 
meaning. This includes using inter-state agreements and domestic 
practices to demonstrate their understanding of international 
investment treaty obligations; under the rules governing treaty 
interpretation, those subsequent agreements and practices must be 
taken into account by tribunals when interpreting treaties. These tools 
might be useful for governments that anticipate potential problems 
related to land-based investments, and that are concerned about their 
international investment treaty obligations being interpreted in a way 
that they do not intend.
A host government that foresees potential conflicts with investors 
regarding efforts to address land grievances may wish to assess how its 
investment treaty obligations would be interpreted in any future disputes 
brought before an investment arbitration tribunal. Although a host gov-
ernment cannot unilaterally change these obligations (except by pulling 
out of a treaty altogether, as discussed below), it can take steps to assist 
future tribunals in interpreting such obligations. Two important mecha-
nisms available to governments to help influence tribunal interpretations 
are through establishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent 
practice” on the meaning of its treaties.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT”  
AND “SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE”?
International law of treaty interpretation recognizes the ongoing role 
of states, as “masters of their treaties,” in managing the interpretation 
and application of treaties they have signed. In particular, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) provides that after states 
have entered into a treaty, (1) any subsequent agreement by the parties 
to the treaty regarding its meaning, and (2) any subsequent govern-
ment practices in interpreting and applying the treaty that establish a 
shared understanding of that instrument must be taken into account by 
tribunals when interpreting the treaty.200
More specifically, the rules regarding “subsequent agreement” mean 
that if, after an international investment treaty has come into force, the 
state parties to the treaty expressly agree on an interpretation of a vague 
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BOX 22: ENCOURAGING  
DOMESTIC LITIGATION
Aside from proactively seeking guidance, governments can obtain 
further clarity on the human rights impacts of granting specific 
concessions by encouraging, facilitating, or simply not challenging 
domestic court claims brought against the government by individ-
uals alleging human rights violations. This may not always be polit-
ically desirable, given the reputational and legal risks that litigation 
can create. In some circumstances, however, such an approach 
may be suitable—for instance, where a newly elected government 
inherits grievances based on policies or administrative decisions 
made by the former administration with which it also has concerns. 
In such a situation, the government can encourage claims by 
making its position clear, and by ensuring adequate access of those 
aggrieved to independent legal advisors. The government can 
facilitate claims by cooperating with court processes, providing all 
pertinent information, and not objecting to the court’s jurisdiction 
or defending the substantive case at trial.198
BOX 23: NAFTA PARTIES’ STATEMENT CLARIFYING  
THE MEANING OF THE FET OBLIGATION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) specifi-
cally notes that interpretations issued by the NAFTA parties are 
binding on investment arbitration tribunals.201 In response to 
certain tribunals’ expansive interpretations of the NAFTA’s fair 
and equitable treatment obligation (Article 1105) in early cases 
arising under that treaty, the NAFTA parties issued a statement 
clarifying their understanding of that provision. It states:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with  
International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of inves-
tors of another Party.
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protec-
tion and security” do not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provi-
sion of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, 
does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 
1105(1).202
provision, that agreed interpretation must be considered by invest-
ment arbitration tribunals. States can form these agreements through 
an exchange of diplomatic notes, or through other steps, such as a 
jointly issued statement. In 2001, for example, the parties to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) issued a joint interpretation 
to clarify the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation in 
that treaty, as noted in Box 23.
The rules regarding “subsequent practice” mean that, after an interna-
tional investment treaty has come into force, if the officials of both state 
parties to the treaty make statements or take actions reflecting a certain 
shared understanding of the agreement, that shared understanding must 
be considered by investment arbitration tribunals. Subsequent practice 
can include “not only externally oriented conduct, such as official 
acts, statements and voting at the international level, but also internal 
legislative, executive and judicial acts, as well as” certain “practices by 
non-state entities.”203 No specific form of conduct is required,204 nor is 
there any requirement that it occur with any degree of frequency.205 Its 
value depends on the extent to which it establishes “common under-
standing of the parties as to the meaning of the [treaty’s] terms.”206
If, for example, after signing investment treaties, officials in each 
state party provide information to the public explaining that a “national 
treatment” violation requires the claimant to provide proof of inten-
tional, nationality-based discrimination, those statements can constitute 
subsequent practice establishing an authoritative agreed interpretation 
of the non-discrimination provision. Subsequent practice can also be 
established by submissions states make to tribunals in the context of 
disputes, whether as a respondent state or as a non-disputing party to 
the treaty.
WHAT LEGAL FORCE DO “SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT”  
AND “SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE” HAVE?
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice can be used to narrow, 
widen, or otherwise determine the range of interpretations that can be 
given to a treaty.207 They help add clarity to vaguely worded clauses, but 
are generally not presumed to amend or modify the treaty.208
Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice are not necessarily 
conclusive on issues of interpretation. Tribunals are not generally bound 
by them. Rather, tribunals must take subsequent agreement and practice 
into account along with other means of treaty interpretation. Some 
international investment treaties, however, specify that subsequent 
agreements by the treaty parties are expressly binding on investment 
arbitration tribunals.209 This gives the state parties clear and strong 
authority to ensure that tribunals adhere to and apply the state parties’ 
understanding of their treaties.
Even in cases when state practice does not establish joint agreement 
between or among treaty parties on an issue of interpretation, state 
practice can still be relevant as a supplementary means of treaty inter-
pretation that may be taken into account by tribunals. Unilateral state-
ments and conduct by government officials clarifying and elaborating 
on the government’s understanding of its treaty provisions therefore 
can still be relevant for shaping interpretation of those treaties, even if 
conduct of the other state party or parties to the treaty does not show a 
shared interpretation.
HOW WOULD  
THIS OPTION HELP?
Questions regarding the scope of treaty obligations are not always 
settled by the terms of the treaty. Many of the problems that govern-
ments have faced related to investment treaties have arisen from 
vaguely worded provisions, which are vulnerable to broad interpre-
tations by tribunals. This creates the possibility that a tribunal might 
interpret obligations under a treaty in a way that the treaty parties did 
not intend, and in a way that creates greater risks of liability for good 
faith actions taken by a government to address land grievances.
A government can exercise its rights under international law to try to 
clarify and narrow the scope of its investment treaty obligations. Subse-
quent agreement and subsequent practice can be used to help provide 
needed clarification on issues such as the requirements for establishing 
a violation of the non-discrimination obligation, the meaning of the fair 
and equitable treatment obligation, the scope of the umbrella clause, 
and, more generally, the relationship between international human 
rights law and international investment law.
WHEN IS THIS  
AN APPROPRIATE OPTION?
When ambiguity in international investment treaty provisions can 
leave a government exposed to potentially significant litigation and 
liability, including in response to efforts to address land grievances, the 
government should consider clarifying the meaning of such provisions 
by establishing subsequent agreement and subsequent practice. To do 
so, a government can take any of the following concrete steps:
Alone and with other countries, a government can:
 ö Make public its understanding of vague or uncertain treaty provisions 
through unilateral action (e.g., by communicating its understanding 
to the public, or posting interpretative statements on a website);
 ö Monitor statements and practice of other parties to its treaties to 
identify areas of agreement and disagreement; and
 ö Cooperate with other states to establish and issue joint statements 
clarifying ambiguous language.
In disputes, a government can:
 ö Remain informed on the interpretation and application of its treaties;
 ö Make its submissions, which constitute state practice, public;
 ö Participate as a non-disputing state party in disputes arising under its 
treaties; and
 ö Make clear when it disagrees with interpretations given by tribunals.
In addition, in its future treaties, a government can insert provisions:
 ö Ensuring that joint interpretations on some or all issues are binding 
on tribunals;
 ö Encouraging (or requiring) state parties to consult and cooperate to 
resolve ambiguities on questions of interpretation and/or application; 
and
 ö Requiring that the home state or other non-disputing state parties: 
(1) are notified of claims filed under their treaties, (2) receive 
documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and (3) can make 
submissions to tribunals on issues of treaty interpretation.
Because tribunals have tended to discount the weight of governments’ 
statements regarding their understanding of treaty provisions that are 
made in the context of disputes in submissions by respondent states, it 
is important for a government, to the extent possible, to seek to clarify 
ambiguities before claims arise.
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DECLINING TO CONCLUDE NEW TREATIES,  
AND TERMINATING OR NOT RENEWING EXISTING TREATIES
The costs posed by international investment treaties, including 
threats to domestic policy space, the potential for incurring 
high litigation costs, and risks of facing significant orders to pay 
compensation to foreign investors, have led a growing number of 
governments to review their policies regarding such treaties, as well 
as to take steps such as placing moratoria on the negotiation of 
new international investment treaties and terminating existing 
treaties. These actions can help reduce states’ exposure to claims 
and liabilities for conduct that affects the rights or expectations 
of foreign investors. A government concerned about the costs of 
investment treaties in the context of addressing land grievances 
might wish to explore these steps.
As discussed throughout this report, international investment treaties 
can constrain a government’s ability to address land grievances through 
actions that affect the rights or expectations of foreign investors 
without fear of incurring potentially significant litigation costs and 
liabilities. A government may thus wish to consider whether the costs 
of such treaties outweigh their benefits and, if so, to seek to minimize 
or avoid those costs. As noted above, one strategy for minimizing the 
costs of international investment treaties is to clarify and narrow the 
meaning of treaty obligations. Other strategies are to refrain from 
concluding new international investment treaties that provide for 
investor-state arbitration or to terminate existing agreements.
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS  
OF THIS OPTION?
Not concluding future international investment treaties and termi-
nating existing ones can help reduce a government’s exposure to claims 
and liabilities under such treaties. Such strategies will not necessarily 
eliminate the costs of these treaties, however.
For one, if a government decides not to conclude new international 
investment treaties, it will still remain vulnerable to claims and liability 
under existing ones. Given the ability of investors to structure their 
investments in order to gain protection of investment treaties, this 
limitation is greater than it may first appear.
Moreover, international investment treaties typically have survival 
clauses stating that, if a government decides to terminate the agree-
ment, the treaty (and its investor-state arbitration provisions) will 
remain in force for a set period, which may range from 10 to 20 years. 
Thus, even if a government terminates a treaty, it will still be subject to 
claims and potential liability for a significant length of time. However, 
a government can agree with the other state party to first amend the 
treaty to remove the survival clause, and then terminate the treaty.  
This approach has been taken to terminate certain treaties with 
immediate effect.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES  
OR RISKS RELATING TO THIS OPTION?
Many international investment treaties were signed with relatively little 
attention paid to and discussion of their implications. As the number of 
arbitrations has risen, and governments have become  
more aware of the treaties’ implications, various countries have paused 
or stopped negotiations of treaties and/or sought to terminate existing 
agreements. These actions, which have been taken by a diverse group 
of countries, have often involved multi-year and multi-stakeholder 
processes.
In developing their strategies toward existing and future international 
investment treaties, governments have encountered some resistance. 
Some governments, for example, have faced diplomatic pressure from 
capital-exporting countries to conclude new agreements and to keep 
existing treaties in force.210 Governments also report concerns that, in the 
absence of treaties with investor-state arbitration provisions, the home 
states of investors will use diplomatic pressure to press for resolution of 
disputes in favor of their investors. Thus, treaties with such provisions 
may, according to this reasoning, help avoid inter-state tensions. Govern-
ments have also noted concerns that not having investment treaties may 
harm (or, at least, not help) their reputations as host countries and their 
ability to attract foreign investment.
These concerns may be overblown. With respect to the concerns 
regarding diplomatic pressure, evidence from investor-state arbitrations 
and other sources indicates that, even when an international investment 
treaty is in place between the host state and the investor’s home state, 
the investor’s home state may still use diplomatic channels to try to 
advance its investor’s interests.211 Treaties therefore may not be effec-
tive at removing diplomatic pressure. Additionally, regarding concerns 
over the impacts on investment flows, data is inconclusive on whether 
international investment treaties actually influence investors’ decisions 
on whether and where to invest.212 Moreover, foreign direct investment 
in South Africa and Indonesia rose in the year following those countries’ 
respective announcements that they were terminating existing bilateral 
investment treaties.213
WHEN IS THIS AN  
APPROPRIATE OPTION?
It is always useful for governments to analyze whether the costs of 
existing or future international investment treaties outweigh their 
benefits. Frameworks exist for analyzing whether to enter into new 
treaties,214 providing key questions regarding the economic and political 
benefits and costs that should be considered. A government that is 
concerned about the implications of its international investment treaties 
for its ability to effectively address land grievances could consider similar 
questions to determine whether to terminate existing treaties.
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The responsible governance of land-based investments hinges not only 
on ensuring that new investments comply with guidelines and standards, 
but also that the operations of existing investments are conducted 
responsibly and that related grievances are adequately addressed. 
Addressing actual or potential grievances offers benefits for both host 
governments and investors, including a reduction of risks associated with 
community conflict.
Yet dealing with land grievances can be complicated for host governments. This is particularly so when 
the investor and project-affected communities have opposing perspectives on how to resolve grievances. 
Moreover, the complex web of legal obligations that bind a government can constrain its options, rendering 
it difficult to achieve optimal solutions in all cases.
As discussed in this report, however, host governments have a range of options at their disposal to 
address land grievances. This includes actions to address specific grievances, as well as steps that can be 
taken to either minimize potential liability under investment treaties, or to improve their general approach 
to land-based investments and the grievances they engender. Not all options are suitable for every situation, 
and some entail risks: for example, risks that the action may not address the grievance, or that the action 
may expose the government to costly legal claims. The risk of doing nothing, however, may be greater.
Indeed, although this report discusses risks that arise under investment treaties, such risks are not reason 
to preclude democratic responsiveness or good faith actions designed to comply with human rights obliga-
tions. Rather, analyzing its legal obligations is simply a useful first step for a government seeking to protect 
its citizens against the negative impacts of land-based investments.
The options described in this report provide guidance on how governments can address concerns related 
to existing land-based investments. In this way, the report is distinct from much of the existing research on 
such investments, which emphasize ex ante best practices to be implemented before an investment occurs. 
Yet the descriptions of the complex implications of governments’ legal obligations can also be read as a 
cautionary tale, highlighting the urgency of getting land-based investments right from the start. Whether 
a government currently hosts such investments, or plans to do so in the future, there are actions that can 
be taken to promote more responsible investment, providing greater benefits and fewer problems for all 
relevant stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
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 ö COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
a form of binding dispute resolution between two or more parties to a business venture or transaction, 
which is usually established by the contract regulating that venture or transaction. Commercial arbitrations 
are conducted before a private arbitrator or arbitrators.
 ö CONCESSION: 
the right, granted by a government to an investor, to use land or a property for the purposes of  
an investment. 
 ö CONCESSION AGREEMENT:
an agreement made between a host government and an investor in which the government grants the 
investor the right to develop and operate a particular investment project. It is a type of investor- 
state contract. 
 ö FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT (FPIC):
the right of a group of people, usually an indigenous community, to be consulted with and to provide or 
withhold their approval before the establishment of any project that stands to directly affect access to 
their lands, territories, or resources. A government must also obtain the FPIC of indigenous peoples before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. Any consent 
obtained must be “free,” occurring without undue pressure or manipulation; it must be obtained suffi-
ciently “prior” to the commencement of the project or public measure; and it should be given after the 
community is sufficiently “informed” about all aspects of the project.
 ö GRIEVANCE MECHANISM:
a routinized process through which an individual or group of people can bring complaints concerning any 
aspect of an investment and seek a remedy. Grievance mechanisms can be operated by the host govern-
ment, by the investor, or by other entities, and can be judicial or non-judicial in nature. 
 ö HOME GOVERNMENT:
the national government of the country in which an investor company is primarily based, headquartered, or 
incorporated. Sometimes referred to as home country or home state. 
 ö HOST GOVERNMENT:
the national government of the country in which an investment takes place. Sometimes referred to as host 
country or host state. 
 ö INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
a form of binding dispute resolution between an investor and a host government that is provided for in an 
international investment treaty. International investment arbitration allows an investor to allege that the 
host country has breached its obligations under an international investment treaty, and to seek damages 
for that breach. The arbitration is conducted before a private arbitrator or arbitrators. Only an investor can 
initiate an international investment arbitration claim. Also referred to as investor-state arbitration or inves-
tor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
GLOSSARY
This glossary defines key terms as used in this report.  
Some terms may be defined differently in other contexts.
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 ö INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY:
a formal agreement between two or more countries establishing the terms and protections applying to 
private investment by nationals and companies of one country (the home country) in another country  
(the host country). International investment treaties also typically include provisions permitting investors 
to initiate international investment arbitrations.
 ö INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL:
the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in an international investment arbitration. The tribunal is the equiva-
lent of a judge in a court proceeding. However, unlike judges who receive a salary from the state, arbitrators 
are paid by one or both of the parties to the arbitration.
 ö INVESTOR:
the commercial entity or individual carrying out a land-based investment project. This can include foreign 
companies and individuals, as well as any company incorporated in the host country by them for the 
purposes of implementing such investments.
 ö INVESTOR PROTECTIONS:
clauses contained in an international investment treaty or an investor-state contract that require the 
government to treat the investor in accordance with certain standards, such as the obligation to provide an 
investor “fair and equitable treatment.”
 ö INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT:
a negotiated agreement between a government and investor covering at least some aspect of an investment 
project; frequently a concession agreement. Different from a permit, license, or other authorization issued 
by the government in its regulatory capacity.
 ö LAND-BASED INVESTMENT:
an investment for the purposes of an agricultural or forestry project that is authorized by a concession, 
permit, license, or some combination of authorizations.
 ö LAND GRIEVANCES:
concerns raised by local individuals or communities in response to the actual, perceived, or potential 
negative impacts of land-based investments.
 ö RESTITUTION:
a measure to restore, for a wronged person, the situation that existed before the wrongful act was carried 
out. While restitution can include a range of actions, this report focuses on restitution as the return of land 
or property to displaced individuals and communities.
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FURTHER  
RESOURCES
This is a non-exhaustive list of relevant guidance documents that may assist host 
governments pursuing options discussed in this report. Additional resources related to 
the report, including a training module and bibliography, are available at:  
ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/land-grievances/
 ö RESPONSIBLE LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS
 » Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (2015)  
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-FAO-Guidance.pdf
 » New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Analytical Framework for Land-Based Investments in African 
Agriculture: Due Diligence and Risk Management for Land-Based Investments in Agriculture (2015) 
https://new-alliance.org/resource/analytical-framework-responsible-land-based-agricultural-investments
 » United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Operational Guidelines for Land-Based Invest-
ment (2015)  
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/documents/operational-guidelines-responsible-land-based-investment
 » French Agency for Development (AFD), Guide to Due Diligence of Agribusiness Projects that Affect Land and 
Property Rights (2014) 
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/Guide-to-due-diligence.pdf
 » UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of 
core principles and measures to address the human rights challenge (2009)  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/BriefingNotelandgrab.pdf 
 
 ö DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
 » Rees, C., Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and Their Stakeholders (2008)
http://goo.gl/2LssjN 
 ö FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT; RESTITUTION; AND COMPENSATION
 » Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Respecting free, prior and informed consent: Practical 
guidance for governments, companies, NGOs, indigenous peoples and local communities in relation to land acquisition 
(2014) http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3496e.pdf
 » Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation 
(2008) http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0506e.pdf
 » UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, 
Miloon Kothari, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement (2007) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf
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 ö NEGOTIATING AND RENEGOTIATING WITH THE INVESTOR
 » International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland 
and Water (2014)  
http://www.iisd.org/library/iisd-guide-negotiating-investment-contracts-farmland-and-water
 » Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Principles for Responsible Contracts (2011)  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A.HRC.17.31.Add.3.pdf
 » International Institute for Environment and Development, Investment Contracts and Sustainable Development: 
How to Make Contracts for Fairer and More Sustainable Natural Resource Investments (2010) 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17507IIED.pdf 
 ö NATIONAL ACTION PLANS ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 » Danish Institute for Human Rights and International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, National Action 
Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commit-
ments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks (2014)  
http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/DIHR-ICAR-National-Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf
 » United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National Action Plans on Business 
and Human Rights, Version 1.0 (2014)  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_NAPGuidance.pdf 
 ö INTERPRETING INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 » Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, State Control over Interpretation of Investment Treaties (2014)  
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/State_control_over_treaty_interpretation_FINAL-April-5_2014.pdf
 » United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do 
(2011) http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf
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